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Abstract 
 
 The Nursing Home Compare System supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) is being widely used by patients, medical providers and payers.  However, evidence suggests that 
the rating system is prone to self-reporting inflation, leading to biased and misleading ratings.  This 
dissertation consists of three essays analyzing a series of issues that arise in this rating system, including 
inflation detection, performance evaluation, audit design, and technology adoption.   
 In the first essay, we use data over 2009-2013 for 1219 California nursing homes to empirically 
examine the key factors affecting a nursing home’s rating. We find a significant association between a 
nursing home’s rating change and its profits, and then demonstrate this association does not always lead 
to legitimate efforts to improve service quality, but can induce self-reporting inflation.  A prediction 
model is then developed to evaluate the extensiveness of inflation based on which 6 to 8.5% of the 
nursing homes are identified as likely inflators.  
 Given limited CMS resources, it is important to optimize the inspection process and develop an 
effective audit process to control inflation.  In the second essay, we first formulate the inspection problem 
by using an innovative graph-based method, and solve the problem based on CMS data.  The results 
support CMS’s current practice in term of minimizing inflation detection difficulty, and suggest an audit 
system.  We then conduct a detailed simulation study on the optimal audit parameter settings.  Our result 
suggests a moderate audit policy to balance the tradeoff between audit net budget and efficiency. 
 IoT technologies enable automatic data collection, which can release nursing homes from self-
reporting burden and reduce the possibility of misreporting.  However, IoT technologies can be costly, 
and CMS may consider subsidizing IoT adoption to control inflation.  In the third essay, we develop a 
two-level game theoretical framework to study how IoT adoption can affect nursing homes’ operational 
decisions, and how CMS should subsidize IoT adoption.  We analyze reactions of honest and inflating 
nursing homes to IoT adoption, and analyze how CMS can control IoT adoption by auditing and 
subsidization.  We also obtain insights on budget allocation between subsidization and audit.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Ratings are commonly used to compare and evaluate alternative choices.  The rating mechanisms 
vary across different application domains: some ratings, such as the vehicle safety ratings, are generated 
through a rigorous inspection procedure or expert evaluation. Some other ratings are obtained based on 
customer reviews, such as Amazon product ratings. Another type of rating is created based on self-
reported measures, such as MBA rankings.  There are also rating systems in which ratings are calculated 
based on a combination of the above methods.  The Nursing Home Compare supported by Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) which is based on a combination of inspection results and 
nursing homes’ self-reported measures is an example of these   rating systems,  
There are over 16000 nursing homes in the United States currently. They provide care to over 1.5 
million residents (Jones et al. 2009) (Donald and Fowles 2012).  In year 2012 only, CMS spent $140 
billion on long-term services and supports (Eiken et al. 2014).  Given the importance of nursing homes in 
the quality of life of patients and the billions of dollars spent on these facilities, in 2008, CMS launched 
its nursing home rating system, which has been widely used by patients, doctors, and insurance 
companies since its inception (Duhigg 2007).  
The system gives a star rating in a 1-5 scale for each nursing home based on three domains of 
Health Inspection, Staffing and Quality Measures(QM).  The Health Inspection is conducted annually by 
licensed inspectors, while the other two measures are self-reported by nursing homes.  Once the 
inspection and self-reported data are collected, CMS will assign a star rating to each of the three domains.  
The overall rating is then calculated by using the Health Inspection rating as a baseline, adding one star if 
any self-reported domain is 5 stars and subtracting one star if any self-reported domain is 1 star. 
The presence of self-reported measures in the overall rating calculating procedure renders the 
possibility of inflation. Cases have been reported where patients’ personal experience differs significantly 
from what the star ratings suggest.  Some highly rated nursing homes are providing substandard cares, 
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even leading to the death of patients.  Despite the importance of these issues, there have been very limited 
research on these topics.  Does rating inflation exist?  If so, how extensive is the inflation?  What are the 
characteristics of those inflators?  How to effectively conduct inspection?  How to design an audit system 
in order to detect and deter inflation?  How can information technologies can be used to improve the 
rating system?  In this dissertation, we will address these questions in detail. 
In Chapter 2, we first conduct an empirical analysis to demonstrate the existence of rating 
inflation.  We collect the CMS rating data over 2009-2013 and the corresponding financial data reported 
by Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development and patients’ complaints data reported by 
California Department of Public Health for 1219 nursing homes in California.  To understand the 
importance of high ratings to nursing homes, we empirically examine the key factors affecting the star 
rating change of a nursing home. We find a significant association between the changes in a nursing 
home’s star rating and its profits, which points to a financial incentive for nursing homes to inflate the 
ratings.  It is however still possible that the star rating increase comes from nursing homes’ legitimate 
efforts to improve their service qualities.  To demonstrate rating inflation does exist, we use the 
independent patients’ complaint data as a proxy of the nursing homes’ true service quality, and 
demonstrate that the association between rating change and financial incentive is beyond what can be 
explained by legitimate efforts.   A prediction model is then developed to evaluate the extensiveness of 
inflation.  The results suggest that among the suspect population, 6 to 8.5% of the nursing homes are 
likely inflators.  We then conduct a variable importance analysis and summarize the key characteristics of 
likely inflators, which provide useful insights for CMS to conduct future audit.  In this chapter, we are 
able to empirically demonstrate the existence of rating inflation in CMS’s nursing home rating system, 
and provide a quantifiable estimate of the system performance.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to do so.  We also reveal the underlying driving force of rating inflation, and show the key 
features of likely inflators, which provides useful information for CMS’s future audit design and 
regulation. 
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In chapter 3, we discuss the methods to optimize and improve the rating system.  The self-
reporting in the rating procedure brings in possibility of inflation.  If all the three domains are inspected, 
there will be no room for nursing homes to inflate.  However, due to limited resources, CMS can only 
inspect one domain.  Therefore, it is important to know which domain is the optimal choice for inspection. 
To address this question, we develop an innovative graph-based method to formulate the problem, and 
solve it with different objective functions based on CMS’s historical data.  The results of our analysis 
show that the staffing measure is optimal if CMS wants to minimize the population of nursing homes who 
can inflate, but the measure that CMS is currently inspecting is optimal in term of minimizing the 
difficulty to detect inflators, and will work well together with an effective audit system.  Unfortunately, 
CMS currently does not have an audit system for the rating system.  When designing the audit system, we 
consider nursing homes’ reactions to different audit policies, and conduct a simulation to study the 
optimal audit parameter settings.  Our results show a tradeoff between the audit net budget and audit 
efficiency.  Increasing punishment rate is an economical way for CMS to save net budget, but will lead to 
more resources wasted on auditing honest nursing homes.  CMS should use a moderate audit policy in 
order to carefully balance the tradeoff between audit net budget and audit efficiency. 
In recent years, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are becoming popular among nursing 
homes.  IoT devices are being used to track patients’ movements and health conditions, and the data is 
automatically collected and communicated through network, which improves the productivity and 
efficiency of nursing staff, and the overall care quality.  IoT can change the way a nursing home operates, 
and thus affect the nursing home’s optimal operational decisions.  From CMS’s perspective, the self-
reporting procedure imposes heavy burden on nursing homes’ operations.  IoT can release nursing homes 
from this burden, and can reduce the possibility of misreporting, and thus can be a good method to control 
self-reporting inflation.  Despite these advantages, IoT technologies can be costly for nursing homes to 
adopt, and thus CMS may consider subsidizing nursing homes for IoT adoption.  In chapter 4, we develop 
a game theoretical framework to study how IoT adoption can affect nursing homes optimal staffing 
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decisions, and how CMS should subsidize IoT adoption as an alternative way to control self-reporting 
inflation.  We develop a two-level problem structure, with CMS optimizing audit policies and IoT 
subsidization amount to minimize self-reporting inflation damage at the higher level, and nursing homes 
optimizing IoT adoption and staffing level to maximize profits at the lower level.  We analyze the 
different reactions of honest and inflating nursing homes to IoT adoption, and find that inflators are more 
reluctant to adopt IoT since it limits the amount they can inflate.  For both inflators and honest nursing 
homes, we find diversified staffing level changes after IoT adoption due to the complementary and 
substitution effects of IoT adoption, i.e., for highly ranked nursing homes, IoT adoption decreases its 
optimal staffing level and for poorly ranked nursing homes, IoT adoption increases its optimal staffing 
level.  We also study how CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT adoption and in turn control self-reporting 
inflation by auditing and subsidization.  At last, we provide insights for CMS to allocate  limited budget 
between subsidization and auditing.  The model presented in this chapter suggests a new direction that 
CMS may want to consider in its rating system reform.  By subsidizing IoT adoption, CMS’s incentive to 
control self-reporting inflation can be aligned with nursing homes’ incentives to maximize profit, and the 
overall service quality of nursing homes can also be improved at the same time.  Comparing with wasting 
resource auditing honest nursing homes, allocating limited budgets on IoT subsidization under certain 
conditions can be CMS’s optimal choice.  
We conclude the thesis in chapter 5.  CMS’s nursing home rating system comes a long way to 
evolve to today’s form, and the reforming never stops.  It is extremely important for CMS to fully 
understand the issues in the current system, such that the reforms can move towards the correct and most 
effective direction.  This dissertation provides insights on various aspects of the current rating system.  
The results can be very helpful and serves as a guideline for CMS to improve the current rating system, 
and allocate limited budget more efficiently.             
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Chapter 2. Winning at All Costs: Analysis of Inflation in Nursing Homes’ 
Rating System 
2.1 Introduction 
Nearly two million Americans spend an average of 835 days of their life in one of the 15,700 nursing 
home facilities in the United States (National Center for Health Statistics 2009).  The Department of 
Health and Human Services estimates that in 2009, 4.1% of Americans over 65 years old lived in these 
facilities.  This percentage increases with age, ranging from 1.1 percent in the population of 65 to 74 
years old to 13.2% in the population older than 85 (Fowles 2012).  In 2012 only, Medicaid spent $140 
billion on long-term services and supports (Eiken et al. 2014).  Despite the importance of nursing homes 
in the quality of life of millions of Americans and the billions of dollars spent on them, very little 
information has been available about their service quality.  The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) designed and implemented its nursing home rating system after a congressional hearing 
in 2007 where Senator Ron Wyden asked “why it was easier to shop for washing machines than it is to 
select a nursing home” (Duhigg, 2007).  Given the lack of alternative information resources on nursing 
homes, the publicly available CMS rating has become the gold standard in the industry since its inception, 
and has been widely popular among patients, physicians and payers (Thomas 2014).  The recent study of 
Werner et al. (2016) sheds light on the importance of CMS ratings for nursing homes; according to their 
analysis after the release of the ratings the market share of 1-star facilities decreased by eight percent 
while the market share of 5-star facilities increased by more than six percent.   
Given the important role of CMS’s nursing home rating system, nursing homes would have a 
significant incentive to improve their ratings. However, these ratings may not always reflect true quality.  
Cases have been reported in which highly rated nursing homes only provide sub-standard care, even lead 
to the death of patients.  It is possible that the rating system is prone to inflation by nursing homes, and 
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the objective of this research is to investigate the existence and the extent of inflation in the CMS’s 
nursing home rating system.  
This chapter is based on the publicly available data provided by multiple government agencies 
including CMS, California Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), and California 
Department of Public Health (CDPH). Our empirical strategy consists of four steps as discussed below.  
First, we explore the financial incentives for nursing homes to improve their star ratings using a 
combination of CMS rating data and OSHPD financial data. We find a significant positive association 
between the change in star ratings and the financial incentives. That is, nursing homes with higher 
financial incentives are more likely to improve star ratings after self-reporting.  Second, to prove the 
existence of rating inflation, we initially analyze the correlation between the CMS inspection and nursing 
homes’ self-reported results. If the self-reported improvement is legitimate, we expect it to be reflected in 
the inspection results of the subsequent period.  We also expect CMS inspection rating and self-reported 
ratings within the same year to be closely associated. Our correlation analysis results, however, shows 
almost no correlation between the inspection and self-reported results, and sheds doubt on the legitimacy 
of self-reported measures. We then further corroborate the results of our correlation analysis by 
examining additional data on patient complaints provided by CDPH: if we assume that the ratings are not 
inflated, then we should observe similar service qualities among the nursing homes with similar overall 
ratings. Moreover, we should observe increased service quality among the nursing homes that initially 
had the same inspection rating but ended up with a higher overall rating as a result of their high self-
reported measures. Our results, however, show significant differences between the service qualities of the 
nursing homes with the same overall rating. Moreover, no significant difference exists in the service 
quality of nursing homes with the same inspection rating. The result serves as strong evidence on the 
existence of inflation in the current rating system as it points to the fact that the service quality is 
predicted by the health inspection ratings which cannot be inflated, rather than the overall ratings which 
can be inflated.  Third, to estimate the extent of rating inflation, we develop a prediction model and apply 
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it to estimates the proportion of nursing homes that have inflated their self-reported ratings. By using a 95% 
confidence interval, we identify around 6% of nursing homes in the suspect population to be likely 
inflators in the current system.  Fourth, we conduct a variable importance analysis to classify the factors 
that their change contributes the most to the probability of being an inflator. Our results demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the current rating systems and call for significant reforms in how CMS and other payers 
evaluate the quality of nursing homes. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 2.2, we discuss the background and conceptual 
framework of our research, including the history and evolvement of the rating system, the rating 
generation mechanism and potential issues, and propose the theoretical framework to deal with these 
issues.  In Section 2.3, we review related literature on nursing home quality measures, misbehavior 
detection and quantifying methods.  In Section 2.4, we describe our data collection procedure and explore 
the underlying financial incentives for nursing homes to improve their ratings.  In Section 2.5, we first 
perform correlation analysis between the CMS-conducted inspection and self-reported measures, which 
cast doubt on the existence of rating inflation. We then demonstrate our conclusion by performing a more 
rigorous complaint-based analysis.  A prediction model is developed in Section 2.6 to identify likely 
rating inflators and evaluate the performance of the system. A variable importance analysis is then 
conducted to show key characteristics of the inflators.  We conclude the whole chapter in Section 2.7, and 
discuss the limitations and future work. 
2.2. Background and Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 The History of Nursing Home Rating System 
The standardization of nursing home service quality begins before CMS was founded.  In 1961, the 
Public Health Service (PHS) began studying nursing homes’ state licensures, after a series of problems 
being reported by the Commission on Chronic Illness from several states.  The Nursing Home Standards 
Guide, issued by the Public Health Service (PHS), specified 77 service standards in health and safety, 
which established the foundation of nursing home service standards.  From then on, this Nursing Home 
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Standards Guide gradually developed and more standards were included.  By 1974, a total of 90 standards 
were included, covering various aspects in health and safety.  In 1977, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) was created as a new federal organization, and continued the standardization and 
certification of nursing home service qualities.  The HCFA commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
to examine the standards in nursing home services.  
A major reform on nursing homes’ regulation took place in 1987, when the Nursing Home 
Reform Act (OBRA-87) was passed.  The OBRA-87 established more stringent inspection, and further 
specified and revised the regulations on nursing home services, including nurse training, care standards, 
sanctions and remedies.  It also established the use of Resident Assessment Instrument, of which the 
Minimum Data Set is a major component, and is widely used today in nursing home research. 
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) changed its name to the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2001.  CMS released its Nursing Home Compare (NHC) system in 
October 1998, in the form of report card, which provides information on Medicare/Medicaid certified 
nursing homes via internet.  The initial system only includes nursing homes’ basic information and the 
deficiencies on health and safety found in inspection, which are also covered in today’s Health Inspection.  
The Staffing measure was included in the system in June 2000, and the Quality Measures were included 
in November 2002 (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2002).  This is the early form of today’s 3-
measure nursing home rating system.  The NHC report card system is influential since it is one of the 
earliest systems presenting publicly available standardized quality information on nursing homes.  
However, the report card method suffers challenges such as the lack of consumer awareness and access 
(Stevenson 2006), and the difficulties for consumers to understand the information on the report card 
(Shugarman & Brown 2006).   
In order to address these issues, CMS launched its Nursing Home Compare system in December 
2008, which is the current system being used.  This reformed rating system followed the 3-measure 
setting in the previous report card system, but uses a 5-star scale on each of the three measures, which 
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greatly improved the usability of the rating system.  The 5-star nursing home rating system gradually 
becomes the gold standard of nursing home selection.  As reported by CMS (CMS 2015), the system gets 
more than 1.4 million visitors per year, with 85% users reporting that they found the infor mation they are 
looking for on nursing homes.  The dataset used in our research covers nursing homes’ rating, complaint, 
and financial data from 2009 to 2013, which are the first 5 years since the inception of the 5-star rating 
system. 
Starting from February 2015, CMS has gradually announced new policies to improve its nursing 
homes rating system (Medicare 2016).  These policies include expanding the targeted surveys, adding two 
additional measures in the quality measure domain, revising the staffing algorithm, etc.  However, the 
framework of the 5-star rating system is not changed.  By the end of 2016, CMS requires all nursing 
homes to report payroll-based staffing information (CMS 2015). 
2.2.2 The Current Rating Mechanism 
The CMS rating system is based on three domains: Health Inspection, Staffing, and Quality measures. 
While independent, CMS-certified inspectors conduct and report the health inspections, the other two 
domains are self-reported by nursing homes.  CMS first assigns an initial star rating to all nursing homes 
based on their annual health inspection results.  The health inspection looks into areas such as medication 
management, nursing home administration, environment, food service, and residents’ rights and quality of 
life.  Ratings are given based on the number, scope, and severity of deficiencies identified during the three 
most recent annual inspections (1/2 for current year, 1/3 for the previous year, and 1/6 for the second prior 
year).  According to CMS’s rating mechanism design, the top 10% nursing homes in health inspection 
receive 5 stars, while the bottom 20% nursing homes receive 1 star.  Nursing homes which rank in 
between receive 2-4 stars according to a fixed proportion.  There is no such restriction for self-reported 
measures.  Nursing homes are then assigned star ratings for the Staffing and Quality Measures domains.  
The Staffing domain is evaluated based on the self-reported CMS Certification and Survey Provider 
Enhanced Reports (CASPER) staffing data.  Staffing domain shows the average staffing level per resident 
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day of a nursing home throughout a year.  The two measures covered under staffing domain are the 
Registered Nursing (RN) hours per resident day, and the total nursing hours, which is the sum of 
Registered Nurse(RN) hours, Licensed Practical Nurses(LPN) hours and nurse aide hours per resident day.  
The results are adjusted for case-mix based on the Resource Utility Group (RUG-III) case-mix system 
derived from the Minimum Data Set (MDS).   The staffing star rating is then updated by the end of the 
quarter when raw data is collected.  The Quality Measure domain rating uses 9 out of 18 quality 
measurement criteria developed from the MDS, which covers 7 aspects from long-stay terms and 2 
aspects from short-stay terms. The quality measure data is collected by the end of each quarter and the 
quality measure star rating is updated by using the results from three most recent quarters.   
The overall star rating is then calculated by considering the health inspection rating as the 
baseline, adding 1 star if any self-reported domain is 5 stars and subtracting 1 star if any self-reported 
domain is 1 star.  Nursing homes who only got 1 star in the health inspection can only have one additional 
star after self-reporting1.  The overall star rating cannot be more than 5 stars or less than 1 star.  An 
example is provided in Table 2-1 and Figure 2-1 to demonstrate the rating dynamics and the 
corresponding events for a randomly selected nursing home in 2009.   
  
                                                 
1 Additional conditions apply to nursing homes which are in the CMS’s  Special Focus Facility (SFF) program. 
 11 
 
Table 2-1.  An Example of a Nursing Home’s Rating Dynamics  
 
Month Overall  Inspection  Quality Measurement Staffing  
January 2 3 2 1 
February 2 3 2 1 
March 2 3 2 1 
April 1 3 1 1 
May 1 3 1 1 
June 3 4 1 2 
July 4 4 2 2 
August 4 4 2 2 
September 4 4 2 2 
October 4 4 3 2 
November 4 4 3 2 
December 4 4 3 2 
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Figure 2-1. The Graphical Representation of a Nursing Home’s Rating Dynamics 
 
 
Note: a In the first quarter of 2009, the nursing home received 3 stars in inspection.  It reports 2 stars in 
quality measures and 1 star in staffing.  The resulting overall rating is 2 stars. 
b In April, the reported quality measure reduces to 1 star, with the other two domains unchanged.  As a 
result, the overall rating reduces to 1 star.   
c In June, a new inspection is conducted, in which the nursing home receives 4 stars.  The staffing data is 
also reported together with the inspection in June to be 2 stars.  The resulting overall rating is 3 stars.  
d In July, the quality measures are newly reported to be 2 stars.  With the other domains unchang ed, the 
overall rating increases to 4 stars, since none of the self-reported domains are 1 star. 
e In October, the quality measures are newly reported to be 3 stars.  This change, however, does not affect 
the overall rating.   
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The detailed items covered in each measure are listed in Table 2-2.  They measure nursing homes’ 
service qualities from three different angles.  Generally speaking, the measures covered under health 
inspection reflect how organized the nursing facility is operating; The staffing measures cover the number 
of working professionals in the facility; The quality measures reflect how healthy the patients are living in 
the facility.  Though measuring from different perspectives, there exist close connections among these 
measures (Munroe et al. 1990; Harrington et al. 2000&2012; Konetzka et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2004; 
Castle et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2009).  For example, urinary tract infection (UTI) is a common health 
problem found among nursing home patients, and the percentage of UTI is an important measure under 
the QM domain.  Research has shown that UTI is closely related to catheter insertion (Gokula et al. 2004), 
which requires frequent and timely care, and as a result, an adequate level of staffing coverage.  It has 
also been shown that the improper use of anti-biotic agent is one of the major reasons causing UTI, and 
the anti-biotic agent misusage is covered in the pharmacy service deficiencies, which are under the health 
inspection domain.  As a result, UTI associated problems are reflected in all the three domains.  A similar 
example can also be found for pressure ulcer associated problems.  As a result, we argue that the three 
measures, though measuring from different angles, should be correlated at certain level.  An unexpected 
low correlation is suspicious, and can be a preliminary evidence of misreporting. 
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Table 2-2.  Coverage of Each Measure (Health Inspection, Staffing, and Quality Measures) 
Health Inspection (H: Health; F: Fire 
Safety) 
Staffing Quality Measures (L: long-star; S: Short-stay) 
Count of Administration Deficiencies (H) RN hours/day Percent of residents whose need for help with 
activities of daily l iving has increased (L) 
Count of Environmental Deficiencies (H) LPN hours/day Percent of high risk residents with pressure 
sores (L) 
Count of Mistreatment Deficiencies (H) Nurse aide 
hours/day 
Percent of residents who have/had a catheter 
inserted and left in their bladder (L) 
Count of Nutrition and Dietary Deficiencies 
(H) 
Total Licensed 
hours/day 
Percent of residents who were physically 
restrained (L) 
Count of Pharmacy Service Deficiencies (H) Total Nurse 
hours/day 
Percent of residents with a urinary tract 
infection (L) 
Count of Quality of Care Deficiencies (H)  Percent of residents who self-report moderate 
to severe pain (L) 
Count of Resident Assessment Deficiencies 
(H) 
 Percent of residents experiencing one or more 
falls with major injury (L) 
Count of Resident Rights Deficiencies (H)  Percent of residents with pressure ulcers that 
are new or worsened (S) 
Count of Building Construction Deficiencies 
(F) 
 Percent of residents who self-report moderate 
to severe pain (S) 
Count of Corridor Walls and Doors 
Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Electrical Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Emergency Plans and Fire Dril ls 
Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Exits and Egress Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Exit and Exit Access Deficiencies 
(F) 
  
Count of Fire Alarm Systems Deficiencies 
(F) 
  
Count of Furnishings and Decorations 
Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Hazardous Area Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Il lumination and Emergency 
Power Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Interior Finish Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Laboratories Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Medical Gases and Anesthetizing 
Areas Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Miscellaneous Deficiencies (F)   
Count of Building Service Equipment 
Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Smoke Compartmentation and 
Control Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Smoking Regulations Deficiencies 
(F) 
  
Count of Automatic Sprinkler Systems 
Deficiencies (F) 
  
Count of Vertical Openings Defi ciencies (F)   
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2.2.3 Potential Issues of the Current Rating Mechanism 
The two self-reported domains can fundamentally change a nursing home’s overall rating. For example, it 
is possible for an average nursing home that has received 3 stars in the health inspection to gain two 
additional stars based on self-reported measures and become an excellent 5-star nursing home. As a result, 
the overall rating can be quite different from the health inspection rating.  Figure 2-2 shows how the 
ratings in each of these measures have shifted to higher stars during a period of five years from 2009 to 
2013.  By design, the proportions of health inspection star rating remain unchanged in the 5 years, as 
shown in Figure 2-2(a).  However, the number of nursing homes that claim high performance in the self-
reported domains has continuously increased over the past five years.  As shown in Figure 2-2(b), in 2009, 
about 40% of nursing homes self-reported to be 4 or 5 stars in the quality measures domain.  This 
percentage has increased to 60% in 2013.  On the other hand, about 20% of nursing homes self-reported 
to be 1 star in 2009, but less than 10% of nursing homes self-reported to be 1 star in 2013.  In the staffing 
domain, the number of highly rated nursing homes also significantly increased over this period, as shown 
in Figure 2-2(c).  Consequently, the overall rating is consistently skewed to the higher end over time.  As 
shown in Figure 2-2(d), the portion of 4 or 5 nursing homes increased from 35% to 55% over the 5 years. 
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Figure 2-2.  Distribution of Nursing Home Ratings from 2009 to 2013* 
 
(a) On-site inspection     (b) Quality Measure 
 
(c) Staffing     (d) Overall rating 
Note: Colors represent different star rating groups 
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The trend we observe in Figure 2-2 can be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, supporters 
can argue that increased levels of self-reported measures are genuine and represent an honest effort by 
nursing homes to constantly improve their services. On the other hand, however, skeptics may argue that 
the improved ratings are not legitimate but are rather a result of nursing homes’ success in developing 
strategies to manipulate the system and inflate their ratings.  Cases have been reported in which patients’ 
experiences differ significantly from the star ratings. Some highly-rated nursing homes are sued for 
substandard care, even causing death of patients due to improper medical treatments (Thomas 2014). 
Since late 2014, CMS has gradually announced new policies to improve nursing homes’ rating 
system (Medicare 2016). These policies include the expansion of targeted surveys, including additional 
measures in the quality measure domain, and adding the payroll information to the staffing reports.  
Despite these amendments, the structure of the rating system has not been changed and it still heavily 
relies on the self-reported domains and thus the newly revised system continues to be prone to 
manipulation by false self-reported measures.  It is not clear whether the rating increase is a result of 
nursing homes’ legitimate efforts to improve their services or a signal of rating inflation, and the objective 
of this research is to answer this question by investigating the existence and the extent of inflation in this 
rating system. 
2.2.4 Proposed Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
Rating system may use different mechanisms to generate ratings but the rating data generally comes from 
three sources: authority inspection (e.g., vehicle safety ratings), customer reporting (e.g., Amazon ratings) 
or self-reporting (e.g., business school rankings).  In the CMS’s nursing home, ratings are generated by 
combining authority inspection and self-reported data in a unique way.  When justifying such ratings, it is 
desirable to bring in information from the customer reporting.  In our rating inflation detection method, 
we use the number of patient complaints as a proxy of the true service quality (Carman, et al. 1990; 
Dabholkar et al. 1995; Tsaur et al. 2002).  Out logic is as follows:  
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1. If the ratings are not inflated, then for nursing homes with similar overall ratings, we should 
expect similar service qualities, reflected in a similar number of complaints.   
2. If there is no inflation, we expect increased service quality for the nursing homes whose star 
rating increased after self-reporting, comparing with nursing homes who initially had the same inspection 
rating but did not increase after self-reporting.   
Our results, however, do not support any of the above inference.  We observe a clear difference in 
the number of complaints for nursing homes with the same overall rating, indicating that their service 
qualities are quite different.  We also observe no significant difference for nursing homes whose star 
rating increased after self-reporting, indicating that their reported improvements are highly questionable.  
The combined results indicate that the self-reported star rating increase cannot be simply explained by 
legitimate efforts, and rating inflation does exist.  
To give a quantifiable estimate of the inflation, we incorporate ideas from the decomposition 
model developed by Oaxaca (Oaxaca 1973; Fairlie 2005; Bauer and Mathias 2008), which has been 
commonly used for quantifying group differences.  Specifically, it decomposes the total difference 
between the groups into two parts: the differences caused by the differences in individual characteristics, 
and the differences caused by inconsistency in the measures. The model we developed is in line with the 
Oaxaca’s idea.  We divided the nursing homes into honest ones and potential inflators.  We obtain the 
unbiased coefficient of the honest nursing homes and use the coefficients to predict the star ratings of the 
potential inflators.  By doing this, we systematically control for differences caused by individual 
characteristics.  A maximum predicted rating is then calculated for each of the potential inflators by using 
selected confidence intervals, and is compared with the observed rating.  If the observed rating is higher 
than the maximum predicted rating, then significant inconsistency exists in the measures, which points to 
the inflation of self-reported measures.  By running this prediction model, we can identify likely inflators 
in the system, and give a quantifiable system performance evaluation. 
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2.3. Literature Review 
The rating inflation problem is an important topic related to many inter-connected fields, including 
healthcare facility operations management, healthcare policy research, and misbehavior detection.  In this 
section, we first review literature in each related field, and then discuss the contribution of our work to the 
existing literature. 
2.3.1 Healthcare Facility Operations Management 
The research on the operations management of healthcare facilities includes an abundance of scholarly 
work, and research topics can be categorized based on the size of the facility.  The first stream of research 
analyzes the efficiency of operations and quality of care at hospitals.  This line research includes 
improving the patient scheduling systems (Cayirli and Veral 2003; Helm et al. 2011) and developing 
strategies to address the demand fluctuations (Jack and Powers 2004), analysis of the effects of patients’ 
arrival time (D. Anderson et al. 2014) or the hospitals objectives (Andritsos and Aflaki 2015) on the 
quality of care and creating alternative operations planning and control systems for curbing the increasing 
costs of hospital services (Roth and Van Dierdonck 1995).  The other line of operations research focuses 
on individual physicians and small clinics. This stream includes design of public policies and novel 
scheduling strategies to reduce waiting time (Chen et al. 2015) and increase clinic performance (LaGanga 
and Lawrence 2012; Salzarulo et al. 2015), optimization of capacity and resources allocations and the 
effect of such improvements on quality of medical services in both primary (Dobson et al. 2011; McCoy 
and Johnson 2014; Zepeda and Sinha 2016) and specialty care settings (Chow et al. 2011; Güneş et al. 
2015).   
Though nursing homes are an important part of the U.S. health care system, operations and 
production management literature often neglects them. To the best of our knowledge is limited to a few 
studies on minimizing waiting times (Zhang et al. 2012) and analyzing the effects of non-profit status of 
nursing homes on their service quality (Chesteen et al. 2005). 
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2.3.2 Healthcare Policy Research 
The health policy literature related to nursing homes is rich, and we summarize them into three 
major categories.  The first category of studies tries to answer the question how service quality can be 
quantifiably measured.  Berg et al. (2002) evaluated existing quality indicators for long-term cares. Mor et 
al. (2003) used the MDS to point out that the incident-based nursing home quality measures can be 
unstable.  Shwartz et al. (2015) discussed the importance of using composite measures to measure 
healthcare provider performance.  The second category of research mainly focuses on how to improve 
nursing home service qualities.  Kane et al. (2001) compared the senior patients and patients with 
disabilities to show the key needs for senior people in long-term cares.  Kieran (2001) discussed how 
improper regulation can potentially detract from its effectiveness and lead to disappointing results.  
Grabowski et al. (2014) discussed how telemedicine can reduce hospitalizations for nursing home 
residents.  Stavropoulou et al. (2015) examined the function of incident-reporting system in improving 
patient safety.  Mor et al. (2010) pointed out that the CMS payment incentives do not encourage the 
incentive alignment of care providers and care beneficiaries.  Many related studies on incentive alignment 
problems are also conducted (Rosalie 2003; Mor et al. 2004 R. Werner and Konetzka 2010; R. Werner, 
Stuart, and Polsky 2010).  The third category of research discusses major problems existing in the current 
nursing home market, some of which are major barriers for achieving good service quality.  These 
problems include racial segregation in nursing homes (Smith et al. 2007), public images distortion 
(Robert J. et al. 2006; Miller et al. 2012), payment policies and litigation issues (Stevenson and David 
2008; Stevenson and David 2003; Smith et al. 2007; Fennell et al. 2010; Charlene et al. 2001; William et 
al. 2014; David, Angelelli, and Mor 2004; David et al. 2004).   
In the above healthcare policy research, the ultimate goal is to understand how good services can 
be delivered to patients.  The nursing home star rating system is CMS’s attempt to implement the quality 
measures developed in the literature and convey the service quality information to the public in a 
transparent manner.  The number of studies on this rating system is growing since its inception in 2009.  
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Li et al. (2013) studied the nursing home satisfaction rate in Massachusetts and found that incorporating 
consumer’s perspective would improve the CMS nursing home reporting efforts.  Konetzka et al. (2015) 
found that the rating system exacerbates disparities in quality by payer source.  To the best of our 
knowledge, there has been no healthcare policy literature looking into rating inflation issues.  
2.3.3 Misbehavior Detection 
Rating inflation is a typical misbehavior that frequently occurs in system operations.  The detailed 
method used in detecting each type of misbehavior can be different, but the common strategy is to first 
identify the abnormal phenomenon which cannot be rationalized should the misbehavior not exist, then 
explore the underlying incentive, usually financial-oriented, driving the phenomenon.  Mayzlin, et al. 
(2012) found significant differences in reviews from a given hotel between Expedia and TripAdvisor. 
Since Expedia only allows its customers to post a review, its posting cost is significantly higher than 
TripAdvisor, where everyone can post. Consequently, competitors have the incentive to post fake reviews 
on the “free” TripAdvisor, but not on the “costly” Expedia, and the results gave a good explanation to the 
observed difference in the two websites’ reviews. Duggan, et al. (2000) conducted a study on Japan’s elite 
sumo wrestlers to detect statistical evidence of match rigging, and found that the winning ratio for players 
on the margin is significantly higher than players who are not. They showed that the incentive structure of 
promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record, and 
the observed higher winning ratio cannot be simply explained by legitimate effort. Jocob et al. (2003) 
studied teachers’ cheating behavior using data from Chicago public schools. He found evidence indicating 
that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected 
behavioral distortions such as cheating. 
In the above studies, a measure of the abnormal phenomenon, such as review scores, winning 
ratio or consistent wrong answer patterns, can be easily accessible.  However, due to the illicit nature, the 
people committing misbehaviors usually attempt not to leave evidence. As a result, sometimes a good 
measure of the abnormal phenomenon cannot be easily identified, and a good proxy variable is needed to 
 22 
 
perform the analysis.  DellaVigna, et al. (2010) proposed a method to detect illegal arms trade between 
countries under arms embargo by using the weapon manufacturers’ stock prices as a proxy and analyzing 
their fluctuations as turmoil and conflicts arise at certain geographical areas.  Engelberg, et al. (2014) 
used the geographic distance between a doctor’s office and drug company headquarters to instrument for 
the likelihood of pecuniary transfers. They found evidence that doctors tilt prescriptions in favor of the 
paying firm’s drugs, shifting away from both branded and generic substitutes. 
2.3.4 Contribution of This Research 
Our research makes contribution to the existing literature in several dimensions.   For operation 
management literature, nursing homes have not been the research focus though they are very important in 
the U.S. healthcare system.  The reasons for this neglect of research in nursing home operations can be 
complicated, but can be partially attribute to the lack of effective and objective performance measures.  
Different from hospitals and clinics, nursing homes’ patients are residents at the same time, and a lot of 
efficiency-related performance measures for hospitals and clinics, such as waiting time, readmission rates, 
do not apply for nursing homes.  Many nursing home problems, however, are the results of chronical 
misbehaviors in the daily care, which may not be objectively measured.  Our research results provide a 
better understanding of the nursing home performance measures, and the potential inflation in the 
measures, thus fill up the gap in the nursing home operations management field.  
 For healthcare policy literature, the existing studies are based on the assumption that the reported 
data is truth-reflecting and the unbiased results can be delivered to the public.  If inflation exists in the 
rating procedure, then no matter how complete the quality measures are developed or how effective the 
policies are set, they do not have a truth-reflecting and solid ground, and the results will be biased and 
misleading.  Our research targets the authenticity of the reported data and the ratings directly, and 
provides a solid ground for other research which rely on these data.    
 Nursing home rating system inflation belongs to the type of problems in which the phenomenon, 
or the difference between honest nursing homes and inflators, can be difficult to identify, both cross-
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sectional and longitudinal.  The difficulties lie in the following aspects.  First, the inflators are 
confounded with the honest nursing homes whose star ratings also increase after self-reporting, thus 
ratings cannot be directly used as a measure of inflation.  Furthermore, there has been no audit system 
implemented for the self-reported measures, and there is no data for caught inflators available, which can 
be used to summarize unique characteristics of inflators.  As a result, there is no training data for 
machine-learning based techniques, making it challenging to design detection methods.  From the time 
dimension perspective, the self-reported measures have been used for years without being audited, thus 
the rating patterns, though probably inflated, can be very consistent over the years.  The lack of external 
shock also makes it challenging to identify abnormal patterns in the rating data.  To overcome these 
difficulties, we bring in the information from the patients’ side, and use the number of complaints as a 
proxy variable of the true service quality.  We then derive contradiction to show that the self-reported 
rating increase is beyond what can be explained by legitimate efforts.  Theoretically, our research 
provides a framework for detecting rating system inflations: For any product or service to be rated, the 
ratings are generated from authority inspection, self-reporting, consumer reporting or their combinations.  
The three are correlated and can be good proxy variables for justifying others and detecting rating 
inflation. 
Most of the existing research only focuses on proving the existence of misbehaviors.  However, 
system reform often takes time, and it is always necessary to give a quantifiable evaluation on the current 
system’s performance.  To the best of our knowledge, few papers have addressed this issue before.  Our 
research makes contribution to the existing literature by not only demonstrating the existence of rating 
inflation, but providing a systematical method to quantifiable estimate the extensiveness of rating 
inflation.   
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2.4. Data Collection and Financial Incentive Analysis 
2.4.1 Data Collection 
Our analysis is based on publicly available datasets from three sources: CMS, OSHPD and CDPH. The 
CMS dataset includes performance details on each of the criteria used within the three domains of 
inspection, staffing and quality measures. For each nursing home, these detailed metrics are accompanied 
with the corresponding star rating in the three domains as well as the overall star rating. This dataset also 
includes other descriptive details for nursing homes such as location, size, certification, ownership 
information and council type. The pooled dataset consists of records from 1219 nursing homes in the state 
of California over the first five years since the inception of the 5-star rating system, i.e., from year 2009 to 
2013.  
The OSHPD data includes detailed financial information on California nursing homes over the 
same period of time.  In this dataset, nursing homes’ source of revenue is categorized into healthcare and 
non-healthcare sections. The healthcare section is further classified by revenue source into Medicare, 
Medicaid2, Self-paying, Managed Care and others. The corresponding revenue and expense details for 
each section are provided, and the profits can be easily calculated.  
The CDPH data is provided through the Health Facilities Consumer Information System (HFCIS) 
website.  A consumer portal is also available on the HFCIS website through which a complaint against a 
facility can be filed directly.  CDPH inspects nursing homes at least once every 6 to 15.9 months in 
response to these complaints as well as other accidents or incidents that are required to report by nursing 
homes themselves, such as fires, disasters, suspected abuse, etc.  Depending on the deficiencies found 
during the investigation, various types of citations will be issued.  A deficiency violating state laws will 
be issued a state citation, and if it also violates federal law, it will also be reported to CMS and included 
in the federal inspection for determining star rating.  The CDPH data we collected contains detailed 
                                                 
2 In California, Medicaid is referred to as Medi -Cal.  However, we use Medicaid as the category name in this 
chapter, in order to avoid confusion for readers from other states. 
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patient complaints, which will be used as a proxy of the nursing home’s service quality.  Note that the 
state level agency CDPH and the federal level agency CMS, though may overlap sometimes, have 
independent jurisdictions on nursing home inspections.  The CDPH complaints may not be included in 
CMS’s star rating procedure, and the deficiencies covered in CMS’s inspection may not result from a 
CDPH complaint.  
2.4.2 Nursing Homes’ Financial Incentive 
The observed rating improvement consists of both legitimate efforts and self-reported inflation.  In order 
to demonstrate the existence of rating inflation we should show that the rating increase is beyond a range 
which can be explained by legitimate efforts. In our model, we perform the financial incentive analysis to 
establish the connection between a nursing home’s financial incentive and the increase in its star rating.  
We then show that this increase is far beyond the limit which can be explained by legitimate efforts.  
We combine the CMS rating data and OSHPD financial data to demonstrate the financial 
implications of star ratings for nursing homes. The combined data has 4433 records for California nursing 
homes over the 5 years.  The average profit per day per patient is calculated for nursing homes in each 
overall rating group, as shown in Table 2-3.  These averages serve as an estimate of the daily profit that a 
nursing home can expect per resident for the corresponding overall rating.  The difference is significant.  
For example, a nursing home that receives 3 stars in health inspection may only expect a $10.79 profit 
from treating one patient for one day.  However, if it gains two additional stars after self-reporting and 
achieves an overall rating of 5 stars, its expected profit increases to $19.8.  Figure 2-3 shows the profit 
trend for each of the star rating group over the 5 years.   
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Table 2-3. Definition of Financial Incentive 
 
Health 
inspection 
rating 
Expected profit a  Maximum 
possible overall 
rating 
Maximum 
expected profit b  
Financial Incentive c 
5 19.801 5 19.801 0 
4 13.602 5 19.801 6.199 (Level 5– Level 
4) 
3 10.790 5 19.801 9.011 (Level 5– Level 
3) 
2 10.108 4 13.602 3.494 (Level 4– Level 
2) 
1 9.286 2 10.108 0.822 (Level 2– Level 
1) 
Notes:  
a If inspection rating unchanged.  The expected profit is the average per patient per day profit for the 
corresponding star rating group. 
b If maximum possible overall rating realized. 
c Difference between expected profit and expected loss . 
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Figure 2-3. Profit Trend over the Period of 2009-2013 
 
 
(a) Using Star Ratings as the Horizontal Axis   (b) Using Years as the Horizontal Axis 
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Nursing homes’ total net profits consist of healthcare part and non-healthcare part.  The price of 
healthcare related services is regulated by CMS’s Nursing Home Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
(CMS, Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, 2015) (CMS, Skilled Nursing Facility 
Prospective Payment System, 1997), which does not consider nursing homes’ star ratings.  As a result, 
highly rated nursing homes do not necessarily gain higher healthcare profits than the low-rating nursing 
homes.  The non-healthcare related services, however, are not regulated by CMS.  Such services include 
residential care services, unrestricted contributions, and interest income and gains from investments.  
Historical data shows that highly rated nursing homes can attract more patients who are in good financial 
conditions (typically self-paying and other resources).  These patients are willing to pay more for good 
quality non-healthcare services.  As a result, the non-healthcare profits for high-rating nursing homes can 
be significantly higher comparing with their low-rating counterparts.  Moreover, the increased demand for 
services that happens as a result of high star ratings (R. M. Werner, Konetzka, and Polsky 2016) can 
reduce their overhead costs and thus lead to an increase in the net per-patient profit.  The results 
demonstrate nursing homes’ incentives to achieve the highest possible ratings from the financial 
perspective, and provide a quantifiable metric to measure such incentives.  In our model, we define the 
financial incentive of a nursing home to be the profit difference between its inspection rating and the 
highest overall rating it could potentially obtain after self-reporting, as shown in Table 2-3.  Note that the 
financial incentive arises from the expectations in both profits and losses.  It is possible for a nursing 
home that has received 5 stars from the health inspection to lose two stars if it receives one star in the 
self-reported domains.  However, it is very unlikely that a nursing home with perfect health inspection 
can be significantly under staffed or provides very poor quality of care. In our dataset, while 125 nursing 
homes initially rated 3 stars in inspection gained two additional stars after self-reporting, only 4 nursing 
homes initially rated five stars in inspection lost two stars after self-reporting. 
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2.4.3 Empirical Model Specification 
We focus on the change in the star rating that happens as a result of the self-reported measures. Our 
dependent variable, StarChange, is equal to the difference between the overall rating and the health 
inspection rating. For example, if the nursing home receives 3 stars from health inspection but receives a 
5-star overall rating after including its self-reported measures on staffing and quality measure domains, 
then the StarChange would be equal to two. 
By definition, StarChange can only take discrete values of 2, 1, 0, -1 and -2, and thus we use an 
ordinal logistic specification in which StarChange is modeled as a function of a vector of independent 
variables. StarChange is determined by a set of parameters, α-2, α-1, α0, α1, which define the cutoff points 
of the five levels. StarChange for nursing home i at year t can be modeled as follows 
𝑃(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑗) =
exp(𝛼𝑗+𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷)
1+exp(𝛼𝑗+𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷)
          (2.1) 
where j ∈ {−2,−1,0,1} and x is a vector of the following independent variables: Incentive, BedCert, 
OccuRate, MarketShare, HHI, ForProfit, Medicare, Medicaid, CouRes, CouFam, PctgMedicare, 
PctgMedicaid, PctgSelfPay, PctgMGD, Chain. 
Among the independent variables, the main effect we consider in our model is the nursing homes’ 
financial incentive, denoted by Incentive, and as shown in Table 2-3 varies depending on the inspection 
rating of a nursing home.  The capacity of each nursing home is measured by the number of certified bed, 
and is denoted by variable BedCert.  The occupancy of a nursing home is denoted by variable OccuRate, 
OccuRate[0, 1].  Variables BedCert and OccuRate together, define the average number of residence of a 
nursing home.  Nursing homes are located in different areas, and may face different market conditions.  
To capture local market features, we use variable MarketShare to denote the market share of each nursing 
home in its local market, defined by Health Service Area (HSA).  Based on market share, we also 
calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is widely used for capturing local market 
competition, and included it in our empirical model.  Variable ForProfit defines a nursing home’s 
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ownership type and is equal to one if the nursing home is for-profit and zero otherwise. Variables 
Medicare and Medicaid define a nursing home’s certification. Medicare is equal to one if the nursing 
home is Medicare certified, likewise, Medicaid is equal to one if the nursing home is Medicaid certified. 
By law, nursing homes are required to allow councils set up by residents or their family members. These 
councils facilitate the communication with staff and get problems resolved more efficient ly. Since nursing 
home residents may be more vulnerable than normal people due to their health conditions, the residential 
council and family council can function very differently in resolving issues and handling complaints. In 
our model, binary variables ResCouncil and FamCouncil are included to respectively, denote the council 
types as residential and family. A nursing home can have both types of councils.  The OSHPD data 
categorize nursing home payers into five categories: Medicare, Medicaid, Self-Pay, Managed Care, and 
Others.  To capture the impact of different payer percentage on nursing homes’ star rating changes, we 
incorporate the percentage of each type of payers.  Four variables, PctgMedicare, PctgMedicaid, 
PctgSelfPay, PctgMGD are added to denote the percentage of Medicare payers, Mediaid payers, Self-
paying payers, and Managed care payers.  The percentage of other type payers are excluded due to 
multicollinearity.  In the nursing home industry, a certain amount of nursing homes is running under some 
chains.  Comparing with nursing homes working as separate facilities, nursing homes in chains may have 
different operational rules and self-reporting behaviors.  In our pooled California data, we have over 1500 
records of nursing homes in a chain, and there are totally 101 distinct chains.  As a result, we do not have 
sufficient observations for each of the chains to conduct a fixed effect analysis.  Rather than adding a 
chain-level fixed effect, we regroup the nursing homes and add binary variable chain, which equals 1 if 
the nursing home is operating in a chain and 0 the nursing home is operating separately.  Table 2-4 
provides the summary statistics of all variables in our model. 
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Table 2-4.  Variable Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Incentive 4.497 3.201 0 9.011 
BedCert 101.964 49.579 19 391 
OccuRate 0.874 0.172 0.0497 1 
ForProfit 0.891 0.292 0 1 
Chain 0.767 0.423 0 1 
Medicare 0.963 0.188 0 1 
Medicaid 0.965 0.183 0 1 
CouRes 0.979 0.143 0 1 
CouFam 0.230 0.421 0 1 
MarketShare 0.0165 0.0159 0.000277 0.125 
HHI 5.249 11.271 0.000765 156.314 
PctgMedicare 0.154 0.127 0 0.921 
PctgMedicaid 0.647 0.235 0 1 
PctgSelfPay 0.0838 0.129 0 1 
PctgMGD 0.663 0.103 0 0.999 
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2.4.4 Estimation Results 
We estimate equation (2.1) by different methods, as shown in Table 2-5.  The first column shows the 
estimation results for the pooled data.  To deal with potential endogeneity, we take nursing homes’ fixed 
effects into account and run a panel data regression which its estimates are shown in the second column.  
Some of the variables in our model are time-invariant.  For example, if a nursing home is Medicare 
certified in year 1, it will most likely remain Medicare certified throughout the following years.  As a 
result, we cannot estimate their coefficients directly through the fixed-effect method.  To obtain the 
coefficients of these time-invariant variables, we implement Hausman-Taylor method, as shown in the 
third column.  In the estimates from all methods, the main effect Incentive is positive and statistically 
significant, which indicates that nursing homes with higher financial incentives are more likely to 
improve their star ratings after self-reporting.  In all the three models, we observe negative significant 
coefficients for variable chain, indicating that for nursing homes operating in chains, their star rating 
increases are less likely to be driven by their financial incentives.   
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Table 2-5. Estimates of Equation (2.1) 
 
Variables Pooled data Fixed effect Hausman-Taylor 
Incentive 0.0325*** 
(0.0906) 
0.074*** 
(0.0144) 
0.074*** 
(0.0143) 
BedCert 0.000284 
(0.000655) 
- 0.00162 
(0.00207) 
OccuRate -0.584*** 0.627 0.445 
 (0.166) (0.560) (0.468) 
ForProfit -0.0128 - -1.578*** 
 (0.112)  (0.332) 
Chain -0.269*** 0.0265 -0.444** 
 (0.0698) (0.247) (0.148) 
Medicare -0.805*** 
(0.170) 
- -2.684*** 
(0.472) 
Medicaid -0.622*** 
(0.184) 
- -1.323* 
(0.595) 
CouRes -0.231 
(0.202) 
- -0.293 
(0.536) 
CouFam -0.279*** 
(0.0693) 
- -0.315 
(0.174) 
MarketShare -6.79 
(4.49) 
-71.073* 
(34.363) 
-60.348* 
(28.568) 
HHI 0.020*** 
(0.00614) 
0.0777* 
(0.0343) 
0.0781* 
(0.0339) 
PctgMedicare -2.283*** 4.280*** 4.242*** 
 (0.339) (1.290) (1.269) 
PctgMedicaid -0.771*** 1.610 1.819 
 (0.254) (1.090) (1.080) 
PctgSelfPay -0.861*** -4.851*** -4.447*** 
 (0.321) (1.063) (1.042) 
PctgMGD -0.446 6.291*** 6.386*** 
 (0.369) (1.207) (1.198) 
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2.4.5 Alternative Incentive Definition 
In the above section, we define the financial incentive of nursing homes based on the average per patient 
daily profit over the 5-year period.  The financial incentive, however, may vary over the years.  For 
example, the difference in the average per patient daily profit between 3-star nursing homes and 5-star 
nursing homes in year t+1 may be bigger than that in year t.  To capture this change over the years and to 
test the robustness of our result, we propose an alternative incentive definition in this section.  Instead of 
looking at a 5-year average level, we instead use the per patient daily profit difference of the year t to 
define nursing homes’ financial incentive of year t+1.   Table 2-6 lists the new financial incentive under 
the new definition.  Table 2-7 then gives the regression results under the alternative financial incentive 
definition.  Similar to the discussion in the previous section, we also run three models: the pooled data 
model, fixed effect model and Hausman Tylor model.  In all the three models, the main effect financial 
incentive is positive significant, which demonstrates the robustness of our results. 
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Table 2-6. Alternative Definition of Financial Incentive 
 
Health inspection 
rating 
2010 Financial 
Incentive  
2011 Financial 
Incentive 
2012 Financial 
Incentive   
2013 Financial 
Incentive 
5 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0.38 3.655 
3 0 0.687 3.399 5.183 
2 2.129 3.525 3.97 2.858 
1 0 1.126 1.447 0.937 
 
Notes:  
The financial incentive of year t is defined by using the year t-1 data.  Since the panel we collected is from 
2009-2013, we have no data to define incentives for year 2009, and the year 2013 data (which should be 
used for 2014 according to the definition) is not used in this definition. 
In early years (2009 and 2010), there is no significant difference in per patient daily profit for some of the 
rating levels, thus the financial incentive for improving star rating is defined  as 0. 
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Table 2-7. Estimates of Equation (2.1) based on the Alternative Financial Incentive Definition 
 
Variables Pooled data Fixed effect Hausman-Taylor 
Incentive 0.323*** 
(0.0202) 
0.412*** 
(0.0253) 
0.412*** 
(0.0252) 
BedCert -0.000111 
(0.000733) 
- -0.000531 
(0.00210) 
OccuRate -0.515** 0.050 0.257 
 (0.190) (0.625) (0.517) 
ForProfit -0.0384 - -0.907** 
 (0.126)  (0.352) 
Chain -0.288*** -0.336 -0.522*** 
 (0.790) (0.265) (0.148) 
Medicare -0.900*** 
(0.189) 
- -2.119*** 
(0.486) 
Medicaid -0.461* 
(0.203) 
- -1.309* 
(0.623) 
CouRes -0.273 
(0.227) 
- -0.244 
(0.495) 
CouFam -0.214** 
(0.0777) 
- -0.142 
(0.166) 
MarketShare -8.128 
(5.101) 
-5.752 
(39.159) 
-19.306 
(32.179) 
HHI 0.0218** 
(0.00706) 
0.0308 
(0.0392) 
0.0344 
(0.0388) 
PctgMedicare -2.189*** 0.644 0.828 
 (0.375) (1.574) (1.551) 
PctgMedicaid -0.862** 1.241 1.312 
 (0.282) (1.264) (1.254) 
PctgSelfPay -0.377 -2.206 -1.990 
 (0.364) (1.281) (1.248) 
PctgMGD -0.563 3.397* 3.481** 
 (0.406) (1.357) (1.350) 
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2.5. Inflation Detection and Demonstration 
2.5.1 Correlation Analysis 
Although the preliminary results show a positive association between the financial incentive and the 
changes in the star-rating, they do not necessarily indicate inflation in self-reported measures. It is 
possible that nursing homes gain the additional stars legitimately through their true efforts.  To explore 
the underlying reasons for the changes in ratings, we investigate the correlation between the health 
inspections and self-reported domains. As illustrated in Figure 2-4, under the assumption that there is no 
inflation and nursing homes self-reported measures are legitimate, positive correlations are expected 
between two sets of ratings. First, within the same year, a positive correlation is expected between the star 
ratings from CMS health inspection and those of nursing homes’ self-reported domains. Second, if a 
nursing home really puts an effort in improving its care quality, these efforts should have a lasting effect 
and lead to better results in the next year’s health inspections and thus there should be a positive 
correlation between the star ratings from self-reported domains in one year and health inspection ratings 
in the subsequent year. 
Figure 2-5 shows the two sets of correlations as described above.  It can be seen that within the 
same year, the correlation between Health Inspection and Staffing is only 0.083, while the correlation 
between Health Inspection and Quality Measures is 0.153.  The result clearly indicates inconsistency 
between the health inspections and self-reported domains within the same year.  For the two consecutive 
years, the correlation between Staffing and the Health Inspection in the following year is -0.094, and the 
correlation between Quality Measures and the Health Inspection in the following year is 0.078.  The result 
indicates that the self-reported improvements in quality measure and staffing domains have no lasting 
effect on the next year’s health inspection results at all.  The correlation analysis serves as a preliminary 
evidence of potential inflation, and triggers our further analysis.   
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Figure 2-4. Graphical Representation of Correlation Analysis 
 
 Note: If star increase is resulted from legitimate efforts, then a positive correlation is expected between 
self-reported measures in year 1 and on-site inspections in year 2 (red  arrow).  A positive correlat ion is also 
expected between the self-reported measures and the on-site inspection ratings in the same year (green 
arrow).  
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Figure 2-5. Correlation Analysis for 5 Consecutive Years 2009-2013 
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For the 5-year period we analyzed, it appears that the correlation between Health Inspection and 
Quality Measures is higher.  One interpretation is that the inflation on the Staffing is relatively easier than 
that of Quality Measures during this period.  We do notice that CMS is gradually releasing amendment on 
the nursing home rating system, and one important policy is to require all nursing homes to report pay-
roll related staffing data since the beginning of 2017.  This shows that the inflation on staffing level is 
also one of the major concerns of CMS, and once payroll related staffing data is reported, the Staffing 
measure will become more difficult to be inflated. 
2.5.2 Complaint-based Analysis 
In this section, we conduct further analysis to justify the existence of rating inflation.  We identify a 
quantifiable third-party proxy variable which can serve as an independent measure of service quality, and 
compare the results with the star ratings given by the rating system. If significant inconsistency exists 
between the two, then the star ratings are questionable, and rating inflation likely exists.  In our method, 
we use the number of complaints, which has been used as a common measure of the service quality in the 
literature of service and complaint management in many service industries (E. Anderson, Claes, and 
Roland 1997; Gardner 2004; Johnson 2001; Roland and Chung 2006). Specifically, we conduct an 
analysis based on the CDPH complaint data which is independently collected data set of patient 
complaints of California nursing homes.  The combined CMS, OSHPD and CDPH dataset has 3850 
records of California nursing homes over the 5 years. 
If inflation does not exist, then the overall rating should be consistent with the true service quality, 
which is reflected by the number of complaints. That is, for nursing homes with the same overall rating, 
we expect them to have similar service qualities and similar number of complaints. Table 2-8 (a) shows 
the average number of complaints for nursing homes with different health inspection and overall ratings.  
In view that larger nursing homes with more patients may get more complaints, we normalized the 
number of complaints by the size of a nursing home.  The normalized results are presented in Table 2-8 
(b).   
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Table 2-8. Average Number of Patient Complaints  
 
 
(a) Original Complaints 
 Overall star rating 
  1 2 3 4 5 
In
sp
e
c
ti
o
n
 
st
a
rs
 
1 7.981 6.989    
2 6.193 6.271 6.010 8.389  
3 3.929 3.934 4.633 4.940 4.056 
4  3.923 3.799 3.503 2.826 
5   6.667 2.157 2.423 
 
 
(b) Normalized Complaints (size=100) 
 Overall star rating 
  1 2 3 4 5 
In
sp
e
c
ti
o
n
 
st
a
rs
 
1 6.505 6.909    
2 5.946 5.687 6.210 8.251  
3 4.366 4.676 4.860 5.597 4.288 
4  4.218 4.459 4.157 3.547 
5   9.473 2.517 2.921 
 
Note: a The blank cells represent the impossible rat ing transaction according to 
CMS’s rating system design. 
b The shaded cells represent nursing homes of which the ratings increased after 
self-reporting.  The inflators are among these nursing homes.  We denote the 
shaded and unshaded areas as Area I and Area II, respectively. 
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For each overall rating level, the nursing homes are divided into two categories: Nursing homes 
whose star ratings increased after self-reporting and nursing homes whose star ratings did not increase 
after self-reporting. We denote the upper triangular section as area I (shaded) and lower triangular section 
as area II. The shaded area (I) includes those nursing homes whose overall rating has increased as a result 
of their self-reported measures. Area II includes those nursing homes whose overall rating either 
decreased or remained the same after self-reporting. This classification allows us to test the following 
claims: 
Claim 1: If the improvements observed are not resulted from legitimate efforts and inflation does 
exist, nursing homes with the same overall star rating but different health inspection ratings 
should have different complaint distributions. 
The results of two ANOVA tests are presented in Table 2-9 (a). In the first column, nursing 
homes with the same overall ratings are grouped by whether or not their star rating increased after self-
reporting. In other words, we examine if the shaded and unshaded cells in each column of Table 2-8 have 
similar distributions. In the second column, we group nursing homes with the same overall rating based 
on their health inspection ratings.  In other words, we examine if all the cells in each column of Table 2-8 
have similar distributions.  As reported in Table 2-9 (a), all the comparisons are significant and thus the 
claim that nursing homes with the same overall rating but different inspection ratings have different 
complaint distributions is supported.  The ANOVA test results for the normalized complaints are reported 
in Table 2-9 (b), which are similar to the results in Table 2-9 (a) and support our conclusion. 
Claim 2: If the improvements observed are not resulted from legitimate efforts and inflation does 
exist, nursing homes with the same inspection rating but different overall ratings should have 
similar complaint distributions. 
The results of two ANOVA tests are presented in Table 2-10 (a).  In the first column, nursing 
homes with the same health inspection ratings are grouped by whether or not their star rating increased 
after self-reporting. In other words, we examine if the shaded and unshaded cells in each row of Table 2-8 
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have similar distributions. In the second column, we group nursing homes with the same inspection rating 
based on their overall star ratings. In other words, we examine if all the cells in each row of Table 2-8 
have similar distributions. As shown in Table 2-10 (a), we do not observe a significant difference in the 
number of complaints, although the overall rating can be quite different. The results show that service 
quality does not improve for nursing homes whose star ratings get improved after self-reporting and thus 
Claim 2 is also supported.  Together with the results obtained for Claim 1, the analysis provides strong 
evidence of the existence of rating inflation in self-reported measures.  The ANOVA test results for the 
normalized complaints are reported in Table 2-10 (b), which also support our conclusion. 
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Table 2-9. F Statistics: Comparison in Each Overall Rating a) Original Complaints b) Normalized 
Complaints (size=100) 
 
(a) F Statistics 
  Grouped by Area I 
vs Area II 
Grouped by 
inspection ratings 
O
v
e
ra
ll
 
st
a
r 
ra
ti
n
g
 1 - 4.61** 
2 7.43*** 6.16*** 
3 13.05*** 5.06*** 
4 14.22*** 8.35*** 
5 5.27** 5.70*** 
 
(b) F Statistics 
  Grouped by Area I 
vs Area II 
Grouped by 
inspection ratings 
O
v
e
ra
ll
 
st
a
r 
ra
ti
n
g
 1 - 0.94 
2 7.77** 3.25* 
3 7.2** 2.88* 
4 10.15** 5.33** 
5 3.92* 2.64 
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Table 2-10. F Statistics: Comparison in Each Inspection Rating a) Original Complaints b) 
Normalized Complaints (size=100) 
 
(a) F Statistics 
  Grouped by Area I 
vs Area II 
Grouped by overall 
ratings 
In
sp
e
c
ti
o
n
 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
1 2.46 2.46 
2 0.12 0.12 
3 0.78 0.78 
4 5.37** 2.00 
5 - 1.91 
 
(b) F Statistics 
  Grouped by Area I 
vs Area II 
Grouped by overall 
ratings 
In
sp
e
c
ti
o
n
 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
1 0.5 0.5 
2 1.6 1.46 
3 0.99 0.77 
4 2.51 0.95 
5 - 3.3* 
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2.6. Prediction Model and Variable Importance Analysis 
In this section, we first develop a method which gives a quantifiable estimate of the extensiveness of 
rating inflation. We then run a variable importance analysis to summarize key characteristics of the likely 
inflators. 
For nursing home that inflates its self-reported measures, the overall rating is driven by two 
components. The first component is the observable characteristics which are common between cheating 
and honest nursing homes. The second component is the unobservable inflation coefficient which only 
pertains to the inflating nursing homes. If we model the overall ratings as a function of observed 
characteristics, the inflation component is unobserved and omitted from our regression model, thus the 
estimates of the remaining observed variables will suffer from the omitted variable bias. However, since 
the overall star ratings of honest nursing homes are only driven by one component of observed 
characteristics and the inflation component does not exist among the honest nursing homes, our 
regression estimates for the honest group will not suffer from the omitted variable bias. To develop our 
inflation prediction model, we first divide the nursing homes into two groups: the honest nursing homes 
and the remaining, defined as potential inflators. A regression is then run for the honest nursing homes.  
The obtained regression coefficients from the sample of honest nursing homes are unbiased and reflect 
the true associations without inflation. These unbiased coefficients are then used to predict the highest 
possible overall star rating for each nursing home in the suspected inflating group. A nursing home is 
identified as a likely inflator in our estimation if its actual overall rating is higher than the highest level of 
its predicted overall rating. 
2.6.1 Prediction Model 
In our model, the overall star rating is used as the dependent variable, denoted by OverallRating. Similar 
to the variable StarChange in the regression model in Section II, OverallRating is ordinal and takes 
values in five levels {1,2,…,5} so we employ an ordinal logistic regression model. OverallRating is 
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determined by a set of parameters γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, which define the cut points of the five star levels. The 
model can be written as 
𝑃(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑘) =
exp(𝛾𝑘+𝒙
′𝜷𝑷)
1+exp(𝛾𝑘+𝒙′𝜷𝑷)
,        (2.2) 
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The independent variables denoted by vector x are the same as the ones used in 
equation (2.1). The coefficients of prediction model are denoted by 𝜷𝑷. 
Since we use the coefficients of the honest group as the unbiased baseline, we define the 
members in this group very strictly to guarantee that there is no evidence of inflation for all nursing 
homes in the honest group.  An honest nursing home is selected based on the following criteria: 
1. Its overall star rating does not increase after self-reporting. 
2. The number of its patient complaints is strictly lower than the median of its corresponding self -
reporting level. 
Our logic for selecting the honest nursing homes is as follows: We divide the inflators into two 
different types.  The first type consists of nursing homes which inflate their self-reported measures to 
achieve higher ratings.  For these inflators to be identified, a necessary condition is that they gain 
additional stars after self-reporting (there can be honest nursing homes who gain the additional stars 
through legitimate efforts though).  In our first criterion, we excluded all the nursing homes whose star 
rating increased after self-reporting, thus we completely excluded any inflators of this type.  The second 
type of inflators consists of nursing homes which inflate their self-reported measures to avoid losing stars.  
These nursing homes may have low Staffing or low Quality Measures that may lead to decreased overall 
ratings.  In our second criterion, we excluded nursing homes whose number of complaints are above the 
median of its rating level.  By using these two criteria, we excluded nursing homes who may lose stars 
due to their poor services, and guaranteed that the remaining nursing homes deserve staying in that rating 
level.   
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Based on the two criteria, we identify the honest (H) group, which consists of 1262 nursing home 
records in 5 years.  The remaining 2588 nursing home records are categorized in the potential inflator (PI) 
group. Note that the PI group consists of both the actual inflators and the nursing homes who improve 
their service qualities through legitimate efforts. In the following, we estimate the proportion of the actual 
inflators in the PI population.   
We run the ordinal logistic regression in equation (2.2) on the sample of honest nursing homes (H 
group) to obtain the unbiased estimates of each coefficient.  The regression results for the honest group is 
reported in Table 2-11.  Both the 95% and 90% confidence interval are calculated. Using the upper 
bounds of unbiased coefficient estimates, we then predict the highest possible rating for each of the 
nursing homes in the PI group. A nursing home is classified as an inflator if its actual overall star rating is 
higher than the highest possible rating predicted through our model.  Based on the 95% confidence 
interval, we can identify 147 inflator records out of the 2588 nursing home records (5.68%) in the PI 
group.  Based on 90% confidence interval, we can identify 219 inflator records (8.46%) in the PI group. 
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Table 2-11. Estimates of the Honest Group 
 
Variables Coefficients 
Incentive 0.102*** 
(0.0184) 
BedCert -0.0115*** 
(0.00125) 
OccuRate 0.863** 
 (0.300) 
ForProfit -1.491*** 
 (0.208) 
Chain -0.430*** 
 (0.130) 
Medicare -2.853*** 
(0.563) 
Medicaid -1.580*** 
(0.408) 
CouRes -0.613 
(0.420) 
CouFam 0.646*** 
(0.122) 
MarketShare 2.234 
(8.146) 
HHI 0.00889 
(0.0116) 
PctgMedicare -0.330 
 (0.758) 
PctgMedicaid -0.0678 
 (0.626) 
PctgSelfPay 1.582* 
 (0.718) 
PctgMGD -2.551*** 
 (0.793) 
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2.6.2 Variable Importance Analysis 
It is important to understand the key differences between honest nursing homes and the inflators, so that 
we can focus on these differences in audits and identify the inflators efficiently.  In this section, a variable 
importance analysis is conducted to explore the key characteristics of the inflators. A subset of the data is 
first constructed by eliminating nursing homes whose status cannot be identified. The eliminated nursing 
homes are the ones which are neither identified as likely inflators nor identified as honest ones.  The 
remaining dataset consists of 1481 nursing home records, in which 1262 records are for honest nursing 
homes and 219 records are for the likely inflators identified using a 90% confidence interval. The status 
of a nursing home is assigned as 0 if it belongs to honest group and 1 if it is a likely inflator.  To perform 
the variable importance analysis, we use the logistic specification presented in equation (2.3). 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜆) = 𝒙′𝜷          (2.3) 
where 𝜆 is the probability of being identified as an inflator, x is the vector of variables that were also used 
in equations (2.1) and (2.2).   
The variable importance analysis results are presented in Table 2-12.  Among the variables, we 
find the variable BedCert to be the top in terms of variable importance. The result indicates that when a 
nursing home’s size grows, its probability to game the rating system increases significantly.  The 
percentage of self-paying is also a key variable contributing to being an inflator.  As discussed earlier in 
the incentive definition section, self-paying patients are typically good in financial situations and they 
contribute significantly to nursing homes’ non-healthcare profits.  Since non-healthcare pricing is not 
regulated by CMS, highly rated nursing homes typically charge much higher prices on non-healthcare 
services than low-rating nursing homes.  It is reasonable to believe that many nursing homes with high 
percentage of self-paying patients are inflating their self-reported measures in order to gain more non-
healthcare profits.  The results also indicate that nursing homes with family type councils are more likely 
to be inflators.  Another variable Chain also has a very high importance.  Note that in section 4, our 
results suggest that nursing homes in chains are less likely to be driven by their financial incentives to 
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improve star ratings.  One possible explanation for these results is that nursing homes in these franchises 
follow chain-level decisions for self-reporting, which are less sensitive to individual nursing home’s 
financial incentive.  It is possible for some chains to inflate self-reported measures throughout their 
facilities.  Besides the variables discussed above, Incentive and ForProfit are also important factors for 
being an inflator.  For-profits nursing homes are more likely to inflate their self-reported ratings than the 
non-profits ones, and the higher their financial incentives are, the more likely they will be inflators.  This 
result is consistent with the work of Chesteen et al. (2005).  The probability of being an inflator, on the 
other hand, is less likely to be affected by market competition (e.g., HHI, Market Share) and certification 
status (Medicare, Pctg_Medicare, Medicaid, Pctg_Medicaid, etc.). 
  
 52 
 
Table 2-12.  Variable Importance Analysis  
 
Variables Variable Importance 
BedCert 0.405 
Pctg_SelfPay 0.288 
Cou_Fam 0.274 
Chain 0.264 
Incentive 0.254 
Occu_Rate 0.194 
ForProfit 0.182 
HHI 0.176 
MarketShare 0.171 
Pctg_MGD 0.122 
Medicaid 0.109 
Pctg_Medicaid 0.097 
Cou_Res 0.066 
Pctg_Medicare 0.043 
Medicaid 0.041 
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2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter systematically analyzes CMS’s nursing home rating system, demonstrates the existence of 
inflation, and presents a model to detect likely inflators. We show that nursing homes have strong 
financial incentives directly related to higher star ratings, which may in turn drive the inflating behaviors. 
We then develop a systematical method which uses independent third-party measure of patient complaints 
to demonstrate the existence of rating inflation. An inflation prediction model is then developed, which 
provides an estimate of the proportion of inflating nursing homes in the current system, and gives a 
quantifiable evaluation of the system performance. The variable importance analysis is then performed to 
identify the factors that contribute the most to being an inflator. 
Our research provides several contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that systematically investigates the inflation in the CMS nursing home rating system. It explores the 
fundamental financial reason for a nursing home to improve the star rating, even by inflating self-reported 
measures, which links the dots between incentives and observed behavior. Second, we contribute to the 
theory by developing this systematical method for demonstrating the existence of rating inflation and 
evaluating inflator proportion. As we discussed earlier, although CMS has implemented minor 
improvements to its rating system, it is still largely based on self-reported measures and does not address 
the issue of inflation. Our research demonstrates the shortcoming of the rating system and informs CMS 
on how to improve its system or how to identify the likely inflators. This study estimates the proportion of 
likely inflators and summarizes their key characteristics. The results can be used to strategically focus the 
future audits on the nursing homes which are most likely to be inflators, and help CMS improve the rating 
system. 
This work also has several limitations. First, we are unable to measure the financial incentives for 
each nursing home at the individual level. This is practically very difficult, since even for the same 
nursing home at the same rating level, the financial incentive may vary over time depending on various 
financial situations. To address this limitation, we perform our analysis on an aggregated level and use the 
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average as a universal incentive for each rating group, leaving the unobserved incentive fluctuations to the 
nursing homes fixed effects.  Second, we do not observe self-reporting inflation directly and can only 
infer it from an aggregated level. This is a common issue in misbehavior detection research due to the 
unavailability of individual-level data. We address this limitation by calculating the highest possible 
rating using the confidence interval and using the most conservative statistics. Third, we are only able to 
measure patient complaints in numbers, but not in “severeness”. For example, a complaint on medical 
malpractice may have much more impact than a complaint on sanity. Future research can apply text 
mining techniques to address this limitation. 
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Chapter 3. Catching Them Red-handed: Optimizing the Nursing Homes’ 
Rating System 
3.1 Introduction 
Nursing homes constitute an important segment of the U.S. healthcare system.  They provide care to 1.5 
million patients in America (Fowles et al. 2012).  Medicare annually spends more than $49 billion on the 
services provided in nearly 16,000 nursing homes in the United States (KFF, 2012).  The medical, social 
and economic importance of nursing homes led the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to 
design and implement a rating system for these facilities in 2008. Given the lack of alternative 
information resources, this publicly available rating system has become the gold standard in the industry 
and widely popular among patients, physicians and payers (Thomas 2014).   
In this rating system, CMS rates each nursing home in a 5-star scale based on its performance in 
three domains: Health Inspections, Staffing and Quality Measures.  The health inspections are conducted 
by CMS-certified inspectors, while the other two domains are self-reported by nursing homes.  To rate a 
nursing home, CMS first conducts an on-site inspection that determines an initial rating.  The nursing 
home will then self-report measures of its quality and staffing which can add or subtract up to two stars to 
or from its initial on-site rating (CMS 2015).  The two self-reported measures can significantly affect a 
nursing home’s overall ratings; for example, a nursing home that initially received three stars from the on-
site inspection can increase its overall ratings to five stars if it self-reports excellent measures on its 
quality and staffing.  Prior research shows that between six to twelve percent of the nursing homes inflate 
their self-reported measures as a strategy to gain higher overall star ratings (Han et al. 2016). 
CMS has limited resources and inevitably has to partially rely on self-reported measures to 
evaluate nursing homes. This requires (1) an inspection strategy to determine the domain to be inspected 
directly by CMS and (2) an audit strategy to detect and deter fraud in the self-reported measures of the 
domains that are not directly inspected by CMS.  This research, as we describe below, seeks to optimize 
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the inspection strategy and design an audit system for CMS to improve its current nursing homes’ rating 
system.  
Currently, CMS only inspects the Health Inspection domain as one of the three domains.  It is not 
yet known if inspecting this domain is the optimal strategy.  In this research, we examine other domains 
which CMS can conduct inspection on in order to either minimize the percentage of nursing homes that 
inflate their self-reported measures or minimize the difficulty of detecting the ones that engage in such 
behavior.   
When it comes to self-reporting, a typical practice is to design an audit system to detect and deter 
fraud. A well-known example is the audit system implemented by Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which 
is shown to significantly reduce the degree of income tax evasion in the US (Cebula 2012).  Despite these 
potential benefits, CMS currently does not have any audit system in place.  To bridge this gap, we design 
an effective audit system for CMS to control inflation.  In our design, CMS randomly audits a portion of 
nursing homes which have gained additional stars through self-reporting, and fines the caught inflators 
according to a pre-announced rate.  CMS adds the collected penalties to its budget which funds more 
audits within the same year.  Under this audit mechanism, the reaction of the nursing homes that do not 
inflate is different from those that do.  In other words, although the honest nursing homes’ reporting 
behaviors are not affected by CMS’s audit policy, the inflators, on the other hand, will decide how much 
to inflate their self-reported measures based on their expected profits under different CMS auditing 
policies.   
This chapter presents major insights for improving the inspection system and designing an audit 
strategy.  We develop a novel graph-based model and optimize the selection of inspection domains by 
minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate their self-reported measures or minimizing 
the difficulty of detecting the ones that engaged in such behavior.  Our results indicate that the domain 
that CMS is currently inspecting is optimal in term of minimizing the difficulty to detect inflators. We 
develop conditions on the audit parameter settings and justify our findings through simulation.  Our 
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results indicate that CMS should apply a moderate audit policy in order to balance the tradeoff between 
the audit’s net budget and its efficiency.   
The findings of this research have implications for other rating systems with similar features.  For 
example, mandated by the Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015, CMS has 
to calculate a performance score for clinicians in the US based on a similar composition of inspected and 
self-reported measures. Similar to the nursing homes’ star rating, the clinicians’ performance score, which 
is the basis of Medicare payments to physicians, suffers from the shortcomings that we discussed earlier.  
As a result, our findings about optimal inspection domain selection and audit strategy design also apply in 
this context.  
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 3.2, we review the related literature on audit systems 
to detect and deter fraudulent behavior. In Section 3.3, we use a novel graph-based model to formulate the 
inspection strategy and convert it into a linear optimization problem.  We use the publicly available data 
from CMS to optimize our model and select the inspection domain based on the two objectives of 
minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, and minimizing the difficulty for detecting 
inflators.  In Section 3.4 we design the audit strategy.  We consider nursing homes’ reaction to different 
audit policies, and derive conditions on the parameter settings of the audit.  We then conduct a simulation 
of the audit process to examine our analytical results.  Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.      
3.2 Literature Review 
Researchers have developed various methods to detect fraud across a wide variety of disciplines from 
finance and management to sports and academia (Abbasi et al. 2012, Abbasi etal. 2015, Wright et al. 2010, 
Cecchini et al. 2010, Mayzlin et al. 2012, Duggan et al. 2000, Bai et al. 2010, Jocob et al. 2003). The 
fundamental approach of all fraud detection methods is to pinpoint “abnormal patterns” embedded in the 
data.  We divide these methods into different streams based on the methods used to identify such 
uncommon patterns.   
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The first stream of research constitutes of studies that apply “majority rule” to detect abnormal 
patterns. In this method, researchers first determine the behavior of the majority of the population as the 
baseline and then identify unusual behaviors by comparing individuals’ behaviors with the majority’s 
baseline.  Josang et al. (2002) and Ma et al. (2013) develop a mechanism to detect fake ratings in which a 
rater is considered dishonest on evaluating an entity, if the evaluation score from all other raters falls in 
the rejection area of this rater’s beta distribution rejection region.  Jindal and Liu (2008) build a logistic 
regression model using a collection of rating features to distinguish fake ratings.  Lim et al. (2010) 
proposes a scoring method to measure the degree of spam for each reviewer to identify fake ratings, and 
apply the method on an Amazon review dataset.  Wang et al. (2011) uses a graphical method to analyze 
the relationship among raters, ratings and entities.  Mukherjee et al. (2013) designs a rating fraud 
detection model which identifies fake ratings by calculating their deviation from the majority.  The above 
studies rely on the majority rule for fraud detection and the assumption that the population provides a 
consistent evaluation of a certain subject.  This assumption does not always hold true, especially in cases 
where the population by nature has diversified opinion about the same subject.   
In the second stream, researchers focus on to the unusual and abrupt changes in certain indicators 
to identify fraud.  DellaVigna et al. (2010) proposes a method to detect illegal arms trade between 
countries under embargo using the weapon manufacturers’ stock prices as a proxy and analyzing their 
fluctuations as turmoil and conflicts arise at certain geographical areas.  Liu et al. (2010) proposes a 
method to detect malicious fake ratings based on overall rating as an indicator.  When a large amount of 
fake ratings is submitted over a short period, the overall rating will show unusual sudden change. 
In the third stream, researchers compare suspicious behaviors with formerly known honest peers 
to detect fraud.  Dellarocas (2000) detect suspicious ratings using the previously identified honest ratings 
as a filter to explore dissimilarities.  Teacy et al. (2006) evaluates the trustworthiness of a rater by 
comparing her ratings with the other previously identified honest raters.  Liu et al. (2014) utilizes 
difference between local and global ratings to identify fake ratings.  Han et al. (2015) develop a method 
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which first identifies honest nursing homes according to a set of restrictive criteria, and then builds a 
prediction model based on the identified honest nursing homes to detect inflators.   
The methodologies discussed above cannot be directly applied by CMS to detect fraudulent self-
reporting in the nursing homes’ rating system.  First, nursing homes are located at various locations, with 
different market environments and types of patients.  As a result, the patients’ ratings can be very much 
diversified, even though they may have received similar services.  For example, some issues may only be 
important for certain groups of patients but not others.  In such cases, each type of opinion can be truth-
reflecting, and therefore the majority rule does not apply.  Second, the self-reported measures have been 
used for years without being audited, thus the rating patterns over the year, though probably inflated, can 
be very consistent.  Consequently, it is difficult to identify any “sudden change” in the patterns of self-
reported measures.  Third, the above methods usually require data on the characteristics of those who are 
more likely to commit fraud.  However, there is currently no audit system to catch the inflators, and it is 
very difficult to identify the characteristics of the inflating nursing homes.  Fraud detection methods are 
usually problem-dependent, and to the best of our knowledge, few effective fraud detection methods for 
the nursing home rating system have been reported in the existing literature.   
Recent studies on the CMS nursing home rating system shed light on this nursing home self-
reporting inflation problem.  Han et al. (2015) collect CMS rating data over 2009-2013 and the 
corresponding financial data reported by Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) 
and patients’ complaints data reported by California Department of Public Health (CDPH) for 1219 
nursing homes in California to empirically examine the key factors that affect the changes in the star 
rating of a nursing home.  The results indicate a significant positive association between the change in 
nursing homes’ star ratings and their financial incentives.  It is also demonstrated that the improvement in 
ratings cannot be explained by nursing homes’ legitimate efforts to improve their service qualities.  A 
prediction model is developed to evaluate the extent of inflation among the nursing homes which 
identifies 6% to 12.5% nursing homes to be likely inflators in the current system.  The results provide 
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important guidelines on evaluating parameters in the nursing home rating system, such as nursing homes’ 
financial conditions and nursing home population in each rating level.  In this chapter, we first set up a 
model to identify the domain which CMS should inspect in order to eliminate the possibility of inflation, 
then look into the design of audit system. 
3.3 Inspection Strategy 
Without proper monitoring in the self-reporting process, nursing homes have significant incentives to 
report inflated measures to CMS in order to achieve higher overall star ratings.  Such biased ratings will 
not only mislead those who rely on this information to make medical decisions, but will also undermine 
the truthful nursing home that pursue genuine efforts to improve their ratings.  The selection of inspection 
domain determines which domains are left self-reported, and has prolonged effect on the reliability of 
CMS’s ratings.  Due to limited resources, CMS only inspects one of the three domains and has to rely on 
nursing homes to self-report their performance in the other two domains.  CMS could potentially divert its 
resources to inspect other domains than the one that it currently does. That is, instead of conducting health 
inspections, CMS could conduct inspections on quality measures or staffing levels.  In this section, we 
examine alternative inspection strategies under different objectives to identify which of the three domains 
CMS should inspect in order to ensure that the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate their self-
reported measures is minimized or the difficulty of detecting the ones that engaged in such behavior is 
minimized.  We assume that all nursing homes seek for the best possible rating they can achieve. This 
implies that all nursing homes can inflate their ratings on domains that are not inspected. Since CMS 
currently does not have an effective audit mechanism and inflating nursing homes are almost never 
caught, this assumption can be viewed as the worst-case scenario.  The assumption is relaxed when 
nursing homes’ reaction for punishment is incorporated to design an audit strategy in the next section.  
We formulate CMS’s inspection strategy in two models within a graph-based framework and then test our 
models using CMS’s historical data. 
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3.3.1 The Graph-based Framework 
We undertake a graph-based approach to model the combination of the ratings of nursing homes’ in the 
three domains and the potential of rating inflation.  As shown in Figure 3-1, each node represents a 
possible rating combination, and is depicted by (A, B, C) in which A, B and C represent the star rating in 
each of the three domains of health, staffing and quality measures.  As discussed earlier, the overall 
ratings increase by one star only if the performance in either of the two self-reported domains is 
equivalent to five stars. As a result, we can transform the five-star ratings into a 0-1 setting in which “1” 
represents being rated 5 stars and “0” represents being rated four stars or less.  Each node thus shows one 
possible combination of the three measures. For example, node (000) shows the nursing homes that are 
not rated five stars in any of the three measures.  For each node, the corresponding probability of each 
rating combination is listed in the parenthesis under it.   
For each domain, a rating of five stars leads to one additional star in the overall ratings, and results in 
moving from the current node to the corresponding node in the next level.  Such moves are represented by 
the arcs in Figure 3-1, which are indexed based on the combination of its origin and destination.  For 
example, arc 14 denotes the arc from node 1 to node 4, and indicates that nursing homes at node (000) can 
have 5 stars in domain A and move to node (100).  For any two nodes connected by an arc, the ratings on 
only 1 domain changes.  If a domain is selected for inspection, nursing homes cannot longer inflate their 
ratings of that domain and the corresponding arcs will be removed.  For example, if domain C is inspected, 
nursing homes will not be able to move to the next rating level by inflating measure C, and therefore arcs 
14, 25, 37 and 68 will be removed.  An extreme case is for CMS to inspect all the three domains.  In this 
case, all the arcs are removed, and the nodes become isolated.  In other words, no nursing home will be 
able to inflate its star ratings.  In the following, we formulate and solve the inspection problem with two 
objective functions: minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, and minimizing the 
difficulty to detect inflators.  Table 3-1 shows all the notations and symbols used in the problem 
formulation. 
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Figure 3-1. The Graph-based Framework 
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Figure 3-2. The Graph Topology 
 
Suppose domain C is inspected, then arcs 14, 25, 37 and 68 will be removed.  The graph is divided into 
two sub-graphs, with node 6 and node 8 be the ending nodes for each sub-graph 
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Table 3-1. Notations and Symbols used in the Inspection Problem 
i, j Node index 
k Inspection measure index 
 i The percentage of nursing homes showing the rating combination associated with node i.   i i 
=1 
xij Arc connectivity variable for arc ij.  xij=1 if node i and node j are connected by arc ij 
yk Inspection measure decision variable.  yk=1 if measure k is selected for inspection 
zi Flow indicator variable for node i.  zi=0 if no flow is coming out of node i  
ck The cost to inspect measure k 
C CMS’s total inspection budget 
vij Ending node indicator variable.  vij=1 if node j is node i’s ending node, i.e., nursing homes at 
node i, can increase their star ratings and move to node j. 
pj The probability of showing the rating combination associated with node j.   jpj =1 
M A big positive number used for linear conversion. 
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3.3.2 Minimizing the Percentage of Nursing Homes That Can Inflate 
In this formulation, we minimize the percentage of nursing homes that can inflate. That is, we minimize 
the percentage of nursing homes that can move to higher rating nodes.  Consider a problem with 𝐼 nodes 
indexed by 𝑖 and 𝐾 domains indexed 𝑘.  The percentage of nursing homes at node 𝑖 is denoted by 𝜋𝑖 , 
where 𝜋𝑖 can be estimated from CMS’s historical data such that ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 1.  An arc connecting node 𝑖 to 𝑗 
is denoted by 𝑥𝑖𝑗 such that 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 iff the arc is connected.  The domain which CMS inspects is denoted 
by a binary variable 𝑦𝑘 where 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶} and  𝑦𝑘 = 1 iff the measure is selected for inspection.  For 
each node, we introduce a binary indicator variable 𝑧𝑖  to denote whether arcs originate from it.  Thus 𝑧𝑖 =
0, iff ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗 .  In other words, at the nodes where 𝑧𝑖 = 0, the star ratings of a nursing home cannot 
increase any more.  The problem is to choose an inspection domain, such that the percentage of nursing 
homes that can inflate their ratings is minimized.  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛: ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑖            (3.1) 
s.t.   Budget constraint: ∑ 𝑦𝑘𝑐𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝐶,       (3.2) 
 Ending node constraint: 𝑧𝑖 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0,      (3.3) 
 Inspection constraint: 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 − 𝑦𝑘, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝜑𝑘 ,      (3.4) 
where 𝜑𝑘 is the set of arcs affected by CMS decision 𝑘. 
Equation (3.1) denotes the total percentage of nursing homes that can inflate, which is the 
objective of this model.  Equation (3.2) represents the budget constraints of CMS, where 𝑐𝑘 is the cost for 
inspecting measure 𝑘, and 𝐶 is the overall inspection budget.  Equation (3.3) indicates whether there are 
arcs originating from node i.  In other words, if 𝑧𝑖 = 1 then nursing homes can still increase star ratings at 
node i.  If 𝑧𝑖 = 0, then nursing homes cannot improve star rating any more, and there is no arc originating 
from the node and therefore ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗 .  Equation (3.4) denotes the relationship between arcs 𝑥𝑖𝑗 and the 
inspection domain 𝑦𝑘.  For each domain 𝑘, 𝜑𝑘 denotes the set of arcs which represent changes in the 
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domain measures.  For example, for domain A, arc 12, 36, 45, 78 represent the changes in measure of 
domain A from nodes (000), (010), (001), and (011), respectively.  If domain A is inspected, 𝑦𝐴 = 1, and 
all the 𝑥𝑖𝑗s for the 4 arcs will be set at 0.   
The logic constraint in equation (3.3) can be converted to a linear constraint and replaced by the 
following two constraints:  
 𝑀𝑧𝑖 ≥ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,           (3.5) 
 𝑧𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,           (3.6) 
where M is a large number.  
3.3.3 Minimizing the Difficulty of Detecting Inflators 
The other objective of the inspection strategy is to facilitate the detection of fraud in the measures of the 
domains which are left to nursing homes to self-report. That is, we intend to inspect a domain such that 
inflating nursing homes, after inflating their scores in remaining uninspected domains, show some rare 
patterns in their rating combination, which makes them easier to be detected. For example, suppose a 
rating combination, say (001), is very common and occurs with a relatively high probability. If an 
inflating nursing homes achieves this rating combination after fraudulent self-reporting, it will not draw 
CMS’s attention and its inflation of the scores will be difficult to be detected.  On the other hand, if an 
inflating nursing home achieves a rating combination with a relatively low probability which rarely 
occurs, say (110), the case will be highly suspicious and relatively easier for CMS to detect.  
In this formulation, we minimize the difficulty for detecting inflators.  The difficulty is defined to 
be the product of inflator population (denoted in percentage) and the probability of the rating combination 
after self-reporting.  The probability of showing rating combination  𝑗 is denoted by 𝑝𝑗 , and is estimated 
from CMS’s historical data.  For example, if measure 𝑘 is inspected, and 10% of inflators will show a 
rating combination with probability of 0.2 after self-reporting, the difficulty to detect inflators when 
measure 𝑘  is inspected is defined to be 0.10.2=0.02.  Intuitively, we try to strategically change the 
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topology of the graph, such that the inflators are redirected to show some rare rating combination after 
self-reporting, and can be detected easily.   
Following this logic, we formulate the model to minimize the total difficulty for detecting 
inflators.  Besides the variables introduced in Section 3.2, a new binary variable 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is defined for each 
node pair, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 1, if 𝑗 is the ending node of 𝑖, and 0 otherwise.  A flow equation (3.8) is thus added to the 
set of constraints described in Section 3.2, and the problem formulation changes to 
 min
𝑦𝑘
∑ 𝑖(∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖 )                                (3.7) 
s.t.   equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and  
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 1, if node j is the ending node of node i, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = {0, 1}.    (3.8) 
 Equation (3.8) defines the relationship between node pairs when different domains are inspected.  
For example, v16 denotes whether nursing homes at node 1 will reach to node 6 after inflation.  Suppose 
domain C is selected for inspection, and arcs 14, 25, 37 and 68 are removed from the graph shown in 
Figure 3-1, resulting in two unconnected sub-graphs shown in Figure 3-2.  After inflating their self-
reported scores, inflating nursing homes at node 1 will move to node 6, with rating combination (110), 
thus node 6 is the ending node for node 1, and 𝑣16 = 1.  However, 𝑣12 = 0, since inflators at node 1 will 
not stop at node 2, but can further inflate to node 6 to achieve a 2-star improvement.  In other words, node 
2 is not an ending node.  Also, 𝑣18 = 0, since when domain C is inspected, inflators at node 1 cannot 
inflate their scores in domain C, and cannot reach node 8, and thus node 1 and node 8 are not connected.    
According to the discussion above, we can decompose constraint (8) into two parts: 
 Part 1: Node 𝑗 is an ending node, with 𝑧𝑗 = 0       
 Part 2: Node 𝑗 and node 𝑖 are connected.       
 Part 1 can be expressed as 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑗.           (3.9) 
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To convert part 2 to a linear format, we define connections between two nodes by exploring all 
the paths connecting them.  For example, for node 1 and node 2 to be connected, 𝑥12 = 1 is necessary and 
sufficient; For node 1 and node 5 to be connected, at least one of the two paths 125 or 145 must 
be connected.  We define binary connection variable 𝑥125  such that 𝑥125 =1, iff path 125  is 
connected, that is, 𝑥12 = 1 and 𝑥25 = 1. The binary variable 𝑥145 can be defined similarly.  Table 3-2 
lists the logical constraints needed for describing connection between any pair of the eight nodes shown in 
Figure 3-1.   
The logical constraints are then systematically converted to linear forms.  Take connection 𝑥15 as 
an example.  Equation (3.10) and (3.11) guarantee that 𝑥15 = 1, if at least one of the two paths is 
connected (𝑥125 = 1 or 𝑥145 = 1), and 𝑥15 = 0, if neither path is connected.   
 𝑀𝑥15 ≥ 𝑥125 + 𝑥145,          (3.10) 
  𝑥15 ≤ 𝑥125 + 𝑥145,         (3.11)  
For path x125, the following linear constraints can be added to accurately describe the connection 
status.  
 𝑥125 ≥ 𝑥12 + 𝑥25 − 1,                              (3.12) 
 𝑥125 ≤ 𝑥12,          (3.13) 
 𝑥125 ≤ 𝑥25.          (3.14) 
Equation (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) guarantee that 𝑥125 = 1, if both 𝑥12 and 𝑥25 are equal to 1, and 
𝑥125 = 0, if any of them is 0.  Similarly, 𝑥145 and other connection relationship can be converted to linear.  
There linear constraints are used in the formulation of the mathematical solutions. 
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Table 3-2. Decomposed Node Connection Logical Constraints  
 Nodes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N
o
d
e
s 
1 - x12=1 x13=1 x14=1 
x12=1&x25=
1 or 
x14=1&x45=
1 
x12=1&x26=
1 or 
x13=1&x36=
1 
x13=1&x37=
1 or 
x14=1&x47=
1 
x1258=1, or  x1268=1, 
or x1368=1, or x1378=1, 
or x1458=1, or x1478=1 
2  - - - x25=1 x26=1 - 
x25=1&x58=1 or 
x26=1&x68=1 
3   - - - x36=1 x37=1 
x36=1&x68=1 or 
x37=1&x78=1 
4    - x45=1 - x47=1 
x45=1& x58=1 or 
x47=1&x78=1 
5     - - - x58=1 
6      - - x68=1 
7       - x78=1 
8        - 
 
  
 70 
 
3.3.4 Optimization Results 
To test our models, we collect data on 1219 California nursing homes over the 5 years since the inception 
of CMS’s Nursing home rating system from 2009 to 2013. The data consists of 3 parts: ratings, finances, 
and complaints.  The ratings dataset is collected directly from CMS and contains nursing homes’ ratings 
in the three domains as well as their basic information, such as location, size, certificate and ownership.  
The finances dataset data is obtained from California Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD) and contains the detailed revenues and expenses of each nursing home.  The 
complaints data is obtained from California Department of Public Health (CDPH) and contains detailed 
complaints, incidents and deficiency reports of all California nursing homes.  The CDPH complaint data 
not only covers complaints that CMS have already considered in its rating procedure, but also includes 
complaints and deficiency reports that are only state-wide and are not reported to CMS.  The three 
datasets are combined and used for setting parameters in our model, for example, the probability of 
showing each rating combination as listed in Table 3-3, or nursing homes’ financial profits.   
The above two models are solved in the IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio (IBM, 2015).  
Table 3-4(a) shows the values of the objective function when we solve for minimizing the percentage of 
nursing homes that can inflate.  If no inspection is conducted, every nursing home can inflate, thus the 
objective value will be close to 100%. Note that a small portion of nursing homes that genuinely have 
gained 5 stars in all three domains, do not need to further inflate their ratings, and thus the total 
percentage of nursing homes that can inflate is smaller than 100% even when no inspection is conducted. 
If every measure is inspected, no nursing home can inflate, thus the objective value will be 0.   
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Table 3-3. Rating Pattern Probabilities (1 for a 5-star rating and 0 for other ratings, based on CMS 
pooled data 2009-2013) 
Pattern 000 100 010 001 101 110 011 111 
Probability 0.6955 0.0540 0.0349 0.1667 0.0267 0.0055 0.0119 0.0048 
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Table 3-4. Inspection Measure Selection Results 
Inspected Measures ABC BC AB B AC C A 
Objective Value 0 0.808 0.923 0.946 0.966 0.975 0.992 
(a) Minimizing the Percentage of Nursing Homes That Can Inflate  
 
Inspected Measures ABC A AC C AB B BC 
Objective Value 0 0.001288 0.009363 0.015885 0.023533 0.042502 0.095107 
 
(b) Minimizing the Difficulty to Detect Inflators  
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As we defined earlier, the audit difficulty is the product of inflating population and the probability 
of the rating combination at the ending node.  For example, if 5% of the nursing homes can inflate their 
ratings to a particular node, and the probability to observe the rating combination of that node is 10%, 
then the audit difficulty is defined to be 0.050.1 = 0.005.  Since we cannot estimate the cost of 
inspecting each domain and the total resources available to CMS, we keep the problem setting as close as 
possible to the CMS’s current practice, and focus on the case that only one measure is inspected. As 
shown in Table 3-4(b), when the objective function is minimizing the percentage of nursing homes that 
can inflate, inspecting the Staffing domain is the optimal choice for CMS.  However, when minimizing 
the difficulty for detecting the inflators, the current practice of conducing health infections is the optimal 
choice.   
3.4 Audit Strategy 
As discussed in Section 3, the current inspection domain is optimal for CMS in terms of detecting 
inflators.  Unfortunately, CMS currently does not have an audit policy for the nursing homes’ self-
reported measures and the inflators rarely get caught.  In this section, we design an audit system for CMS 
and conduct a one-year audit simulation based on the most recent available data for year 2013. Table 3-5 
lists all the notations and symbols used in the audit simulation.  
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Table 3-5. Notations and Symbols used in the Audit Simulation 
p1 The audit percentage of nursing homes whose star ratings increase one star after self-reporting  
p2 The audit percentage of nursing homes whose star ratings increase one star after self-reporting 
r The punishment rate  
B0 The net budget CMS has at the beginning of the year 
c The cost for auditing one nursing home 
A1 The additional profit a nursing home can gain by improving its rating by one star 
A2 The additional profit a nursing home can gain by improving its rating by two stars 
PCI The percentage of caught inflators 
PAH The percentage of audited honest nursing homes 
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Our audit design assumes that CMS continues inspecting the current domain (Health Inspection) 
to minimize the difficulty for detecting inflators.  We assume that CMS publicly announces the following 
audit policy to all nursing homes:  
• Nursing homes whose overall star ratings increase after self-reporting are subject to audit.  An 
audit can distinguish honest from inflating nursing home without any errors. That is, if audited, an 
inflating nursing home will definitely get caught and an honest nursing will definitely get 
exonerated.  
• Nursing homes whose rating increase 1 star or 2 stars after self-reporting will be randomly 
selected for auditing.  The probabilities to be selected are 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, respectively. 
• Each caught inflator is subject to a fine calculated based on the illegitimate profit it has gained 
through inflation.  The punishment rate is 𝑟.  For example, if a 3-star nursing home inflates its 
rating to 5 stars and consequently increases its per patient profit from 10 to 17, then the nursing 
home’s illegitimate profit is 17 − 10 = 7.  If it is caught in the audit, its punishment will be 
7 × (1 + 𝑟).  The expected profit for each nursing home is calculated by using the OSHPD 
financial data for nursing homes. 
• CMS is a federal agency and its budget is assigned on an annual basis.  To reflect this fact in the 
audit simulation, we assume that CMS has a fixed net audit budget (𝐵0 ) at each year from 
government financial allocation.  We further assume that all penalties collected from caught 
inflators and the net audit budget B0 are used in auditing nursing homes within the same year.   
3.4.1 Nursing Homes’ Reaction to Audit Policy 
Given CMS’s audit policy, nursing homes which have the intention to inflate will have to decide what to 
self-report.  By using the latest available year (2013) in our dataset, and by applying the method presented 
in Han et al. (2015) using a 90% CI, we can identify the likely inflators in the population.  There was no 
effective audit on nursing homes’ self-reported measures in 2013, thus nursing homes who did not inflate 
their ratings are identified to be honest, and assumed to have no intention to inflate, no matter what audit 
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policy is used.  The nursing home population is then divided into two groups: the inflators and honest 
nursing homes.  The inflators will react to different audit policies differently, while the honest nursing 
homes will report the truth, no matter what audit policy is used.  By using OSHPD financial data for 
nursing home, we can also calculate the expected profit for nursing homes in each Health Inspection star 
rating.  We denote the additional profit for inflating one star or two stars as 𝐴1 and by 𝐴2, respectively.  
According to the rating mechanism, nursing homes receiving one star or four stars in health inspections 
can only increase their overall ratings by one star, thus for them, 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 are equal. 
Any nursing home reporting a star increase will be subject to CMS’s audit.  Nursing homes 
whose overall ratings increases by one star or two stars are randomly selected for auditing according to 
pre-announced probability 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, respectively.  If an inflator is caught, the illegitimate additional 
profit gained through inflating will be confiscated and a fine will be issued against the nursing home 
based on the pre-announced rate r.  As a result, for a given combination of 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 and 𝑟, a nursing home 
considering inflating calculates its expected payoff for the following three choices:  
• Being honest: Payoff0= 0 
• Inflating one measure: Payoff1 = 𝐴1  (1 − 𝑝1) − 𝑝1𝑟 𝐴1 = 𝐴1(1 −  𝑝1  −  𝑝1 𝑟) 
• Inflating both measures:Payoff2 = 𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2) − 𝑝2𝑟𝐴2 = 𝐴2(1 −  𝑝2  − 𝑝2𝑟) 
The nursing home will inflate its rating if 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟 > 0  or 1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟 > 0.  That is 
 𝑟 <
1−𝑝1
𝑝1
, or           (3.15) 
  𝑟 <
1−𝑝2
𝑝2
.          (3.16) 
If either equation (3.15) or equation (3.16) is satisfied, then the nursing home will choose to 
inflate.  If equation (3.15) and (3.16) are both satisfied, then the nursing home compares the expected 
payoffs, and will inflate two stars instead of one star, if 
 ∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟) > ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟).      (3.17)  
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3.4.2 Objective Functions of Audit Strategy 
An increase in the overall star rating is not limited to inflating nursing homes only and can also be the 
result of legitimate efforts by honest nursing homes to improve their performance.  From CMS’s point of 
view, auditing an honest nursing home will lead to a waste of audit resource, while auditing an inflating 
nursing home will deter others and result in collection of additional penalties which will fund more audits.  
Suppose the population of nursing homes whose ratings increase by 1 and by 2 stars are 𝜋1 and 
𝜋2, respectively.  In addition to inflating nursing homes, 1 and 2 also include honest nursing homes 
reporting rating improvements.  Both 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 are functions of 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 𝑟.  The unit cost for auditing a 
nursing home is denoted by 𝑐.  The fine collected from the caught inflators is also a function of 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 
𝑟 and is denoted by 𝐹(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟).  We consider the following two objectives for designing the audit system 
for CMS, both of which are important indicators of the performance of an audit system.   
• For targeted auditing probabilities 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, CMS wants to minimize the initial fixed budget 
(𝐵0). 
• CMS wants to maximize the efficiency of its audits, as the ratio between the percentage of caught 
inflators and the percentage of audited honest nursing homes. That is CMS wants more resources 
spent on auditing inflators and less resources wasted on auditing honest nursing homes.  
For either objective used, CMS needs to make sure the following budget constraint is satisfied. 
 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟)𝑝1𝑐 + 𝜋2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟)𝑝2𝑐 ≤ 𝐵0 + 𝐹(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟)     (3.18) 
The left-hand side of equation (3.18) denotes the total costs for auditing selected nursing homes.  
It includes both honest and inflating nursing homes selected to be audited.  The inflators will then get 
caught and fined, and the collected fines will be added to CMS’s initial budget,  𝐵0, as shown on the right-
hand side of equation (3.18).  For simplicity, in (3.18), we assume the fines are immediately collected and 
can be used toward auditing more nursing homes within the same year.   
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3.4.3 Simulation Results  
Neither the initial budget, nor the audit efficiency can be easily formulated in a linear form.  In view of 
this, we conduct a simulation to summarize useful insights on parameter settings instead of solving the 
problem analytically.   
 Consider a one year setting in which CMS’s audit policy is announced at the beginning of the 
year.  Given CMS’s audit policy, inflating nursing homes react differently according to the expected 
payoffs; some choose to inflate two measures, some choose to inflate one measure, and some choose not 
to inflate.  By the end of the year, CMS conducts the audit by randomly selecting 𝑝1 percent of the 
nursing homes whose star ratings increase by one star, and 𝑝2 percent of the nursing homes whose star 
ratings increase by two stars.  The caught inflators are fined according to the punishment rate 𝑟.  CMS 
keeps the total cost of audit under the initial budget 𝐵0 plus the collected fines.  We set the simulation 
parameters by using the 2013 data, which is the latest available in our dataset.  According to the method 
developed in Han et al. (2015), we pre-identify the likely inflators in the nursing home population.  We 
then exhaust all possible combinations of 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 𝑟 with step size 0.01, and calculate the net budget 𝐵0 
and the audit efficiency.  
The analysis of the relationship between the initial audit budget, 𝐵0, the probability of audits, 𝑝1,
𝑝2, and the rate of penalties, 𝑟, is important, albeit complicated.  Increasing the audit probabilities, and the 
penalties on one hand results in more inflators being caught, and more funds being collected and therefore 
lowers the level of required initial budget, while on the other hand, it deters some of the nursing homes 
from inflating, which in turn reduces the number of inflators being caught and the penalties being 
collected which increases the level of required initial budget.  
Complete Inflation Determent: 
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It is of significant importance for CMS to analyze the optimal parameter settings to completely deter 
inflation.  According to equation (3.17), nursing homes will stop inflating when the expected payoff of 
inflation equals 0.  The conditions are expressed in equation (3.19) and (3.20). 
 ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1) − ∆𝐴1𝑝1𝑟 = 0,        (3.19) 
 ∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2) − ∆𝐴2𝑝2𝑟 = 0.        (3.20) 
Solving equation (3.19) and (3.20), we can obtain the marginal probability for deterring inflation:  
 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 =
1
1+𝑟
.                  (3.21) 
Equation (3.21) is consistent with equation (3.15) and (3.16), and defines the minimum audit 
probabilities, 𝑝1, 𝑝2 for a given penalty rate, 𝑟, to absolutely deter inflation and ensure that no nursing 
home has any incentive to inflate.  Equation (3.21) also indicates that when 𝑝1, 𝑝2 are set higher than 
1
1+𝑟
, 
CMS’s resource will be “wasted” on auditing honest nursing homes who report true improvements, as no 
nursing home will have any reason to inflate under those audit policies.  Table 3-6 lists the simulation 
results of minimum audit probabilities, 𝑝1, 𝑝2 for a given penalty rate, 𝑟, and the corresponding initial 
budget 𝐵0.  The minimums of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 obtained from the simulation are equal, which is consistent with 
equation (3.21).  When punishment rate 𝑟 increases, the corresponding minimum 𝑝1  and 𝑝2 needed to 
absolutely deter inflating decreases.  This result shows a tradeoff between audit probabilities and 
punishment rate to achieve the same level of audit power.  From Table 3-6, we also observe that when the 
penalty rate 𝑟 increases, the corresponding net budget B0 decreases.  The reason is that when inflation is 
absolutely deterred, CMS collects no fine from auditing, and has to solely rely on net budget B0 to support 
the audit.  Under this circumstance, the lower p1 and p2 are, the smaller audit work load is required, thus 
the less net budget is needed.  The results also indicate that though increasing audit probabilities and 
increasing penalty rate can both deter inflation, the way they function is different.  When increasing audit 
probabilities, CMS increases the audit work load at the same time, and the audit cost, which is 
proportional to the audit work load in our model, will increase.  On the other hand, increasing the 
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punishment rate has no explicit relationship with the increase of audit work load, and can be a more 
economical way for CMS to deter inflation.   
Incomplete Inflation Determent:  
Completely deterring rating inflation, though desirable , may not be feasible in reality, since the audit 
probability is limited by financial budget and human resource, and the maximum punishment rate is 
typically restricted by law.  While certain level of inflation may be inevitable, the problem for CMS 
changes to find the optimal parameter settings under the given net budget.  Since audits impose 
unnecessarily burdens on honest nursing homes, it is desirable that CMS can focus its resources to audit 
more inflators and fewer honest nursing homes.  Following this idea, we formulate the audit efficiency.  
We define the Percentage of Caught Inflators (PCI) to be the ratio between caught inflators and the total 
inflators in the system, and the Percentage of Audited Honest Nursing Homes (PAH) to be the ratio 
between audited honest nursing homes and the total honest nursing homes in the system.  By definition, 
both PCI and PAH are within the interval [0, 1].  The audit efficiency curve, defined as the corresponding 
PCI given a certain PAH, denoted as PCI(PAH), can then be plotted in a 11 square area, where the y-
axis represents the PCI, and x-axis represents the PAH.  Note that a given PAH can be achieved by 
multiple combinations of 𝑝1, 𝑝2, and 𝑟, resulting in different PCIs. 
 To study the properties of the audit efficiency, we focus on the upper and lower limits of PCI, as 
the maximum the minimum of audit efficiency.  In the year 2013, the overall star ratings of 496 nursing  
homes increased as a result of their self-reported measures, of which 122 are identified as likely inflators 
(Han et al., 2015).  We set up our simulation based on these statistics.  The following propositions are 
derived. 
Proposition 1:  
The maximum audit efficiency is achieved at r=0, and does not change with respect to B0, i.e., 
B0x,B0y {0, R
+}, B0x  B0y, 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟
𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻, 𝐵0𝑥 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟
𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻, 𝐵0𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝1,𝑝2,0
𝑃𝐶𝐼(𝑃𝐴𝐻).  
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Proposition 2:  
 (2.1) Given p2 and r, the maximum audit efficiency converges to p2 monotonically when p11. 
 (2.2) Given p1 and r, the maximum audit efficiency converges to p1 when p21. 
 (2.3) If ∆𝐴2 ∙ 𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1 ∙ 𝑝1 < 0, or  
𝑝1
𝑝2
>
∆𝐴2
∆𝐴1
> 1, then the maximum audit efficiency does not 
change with respect to 𝑟.  If 
𝑝1
𝑝2
<
∆𝐴2
∆𝐴1
, then the maximum audit efficiency depends on the values of 
p1, p2, ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓1 and ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓2, and is piecewise linear. 
 The proofs of the propositions are provided in the appendix.   
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Figure 3-3. Efficiency Curves given different net budget B0 
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 Table 3-6. Optimal Policy Parameters for Deterring Inflation 
r 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 
p1 0.91 0.77 0.67 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.4 0.38 0.35 
p2 0.91 0.77 0.67 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.4 0.38 0.35 
B0 340.34 287.98 250.58 220.66 198.22 179.52 164.56 149.6 142.12 130.9 
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 We justify the propositions using simulation results.  Figure 3-3(a) shows the maximum audit 
efficiency CMS can achieve given different net budget B0.  On the contrast, Figure 3-3(b) shows the 
lowest audit efficiency CMS can achieve.   
According to Figure 3-3, the maximum audit efficiency is achieved at 𝑟=0, and increasing B0 
cannot lead to an increase in the audit efficiency.  When 𝑟=0, nursing homes have no consequence when 
caught inflating, thus all the non-honest nursing homes that may inflate will choose to inflate.  As a result, 
the inflator proportion in the suspect group reaches the maximum, and the audit efficiency reaches the 
maximum at the given audit probabilities.  The result is consistent with what is proved in Proposition 1.  
In this case, increasing B0 will not result in detecting more inflators, but can only put more honest nursing 
homes under audit.  On the other hand, the lowest audit efficiency will become even lower when B0 
increases.  This is because for the same percentage of caught inflators (PCI), more honest nursing homes 
are audited (higher PAH).  From Figure 3-3, we also know that the maximum audit efficiency curve is 
piecewise linear and monotonically non-decreasing.  These properties on the maximum audit efficiency 
curve is also consistent with the results derived in Proposition 2.   
 Combining the conclusion obtained from Table 3-6 in Section 3.4.3, we reach the following 
conclusion on audit parameter settings: If CMS has enough net budget to completely deter inflation, then 
adopting an audit policy with higher penalty rate is more economical than increasing the audit 
probabilities, and will lead to a lower net budget.  However, under high punishment rate, few nursing 
homes will choose to inflate.  As a result, most of the resources will be spent on auditing honest nursing 
homes, leading to a low audit efficiency.  Increasing audit probabilities can also deter inflation, but it will 
increase the total cost of audit as well.  If CMS does not have enough net budget to completely deter 
inflation, and certain level of inflation is inevitable, the problem is to find an optimal combination of 𝑝1,
𝑝2 and 𝑟 for the given net budget.  Under this circumstance, we recommend CMS to carefully balance the 
tradeoff between net budget and audit efficiency; Specifically, the punishment rate should be relatively 
high in order to keep the net audit budget within control; however, the punishment rate cannot be too high 
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in order to achieve a good audit efficiency, i.e., a good amount of money should be spent on auditing 
inflators, not on auditing honest nursing homes who made real service improvements. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we systematically investigate the inspection measure selection and audit design in the 
CMS’s nursing home rating system.  For the inspection measure selection problem, we formulate it 
mathematically by using an innovative graph-based framework, and solve it optimally by using CMS’s 
data.  Our result indicates that CMS’s current inspection domain is optimal if an effective follow-up audit 
policy is in place.  We then design the audit system for CMS, with nursing homes’ different reactions 
taken into consideration.  To study the parameter settings of the audit, we first derive analytical conditions 
on the parameter settings, and then conduct a simulation to justify the results.  We find that CMS has to 
carefully balance the tradeoff between net audit budget and audit efficiency in order to achieve a good 
control of self-reporting inflation.   
 Due to the assumptions and the dataset, this research may have the following limitations.  In the 
inspection problem, it is difficult to accurately measure the cost for inspecting each measure.  Our result 
is obtained based on the assumption that the cost for inspecting each measure is similar and comparable.  
The real situation may depend on several factors, leading to different cost for inspecting each measure, 
e.g., regulations for each area may be different, and the cost for investigat ing each nursing home is case 
dependent.  Our result, however, is a reasonable estimate of the current system, and provides a theoretical 
framework for optimizing the inspection structure.  In the audit design, we assume that the fines can be 
collected immediately and used in audit within the same year.  Since fine collection takes time, and CMS 
may have different arrangement of the fines, it is possible that not all fines are available to use within the 
same year.  Suppose that only a portion, say , of the collected fines can be used in the same year for 
auditing.  In this case, the audit can be considered to have an adjusted punishment rate r’=r.  The 
quantitative results we obtained, for example B0, will be different in this case, but most qualitative results 
should still hold.  In view that no audit is currently conducted for nursing homes’ self-reporting, our 
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design provides a reasonable plan for CMS, which can serve as a benchmark for other audit system 
designs.  The audit simulation is conducted based on the 2013 data of the California nursing home market.  
For other states or other years, there can be difference in the proportion of inflators.  However, we argue 
that the population of nursing homes in California is big and the case is representative, and the number of 
inflators in year 2013 is reasonably close to the amount in the current system.   
 Our result not only provides insights and theoretical support for CMS’s current rating system but 
also provides guidelines for the future audit mechanism design.  Moreover, our result has important 
managerial application on other rating systems sharing similar features.  A good example is to apply the 
results on the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), which rates the physicians based on a 
combination of inspection and their self-reported measures, and adjusts the payment rates based on the 
ratings.  With the fast development of healthcare IT, justifiable self-reported measures can have a wide 
application in different rating systems in order to reduce the cost to evaluate these measures.  Our 
research provides a good framework to systematically control the quality of self-reported measures, which 
guarantees the accuracy of online ratings.  
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Appendix 3 
Proof for Proposition 1: 
We first divide the nursing home population into 4 different types, as shown in Figure 3-A.1.  
The PAH is calculated as  
𝑃𝐴𝐻 =
πHI2 p2 + πHI1 p1
πHI2  + πHI1  
   
Note that PAH is a linear combination of p1 and p2, since HI1 and HI2 are constant. 
The PCI is calculated as  
𝑃𝐶𝐼 =
πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) ∙ p2  + πLI1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) ∙ p1
πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) + πLI1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) 
=
1
𝜋𝐿𝐼
(πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) ∙ p2  + πLI1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) ∙ p1 ) 
Where 𝜋𝐿𝐼 = πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) + πLI1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) denotes the total number of inflators in the system.  The 
first term in the parenthesis denotes the caught inflators from the 2-star suspect group, and the second 
term denotes the caught inflators from the 1-star group. 
Since πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) and πLI1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) are both non-increasing in r, the linear combination 
πLI2(𝑝1, 𝑝2,𝑟) ∙ p2  +  πLI1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑟) ∙ p1  is maximized at r=0.  For higher B0, higher punishment rate r 
can be used in the audit, however, the audit efficiency is maximized at r=0, and higher net budget B0 does 
not result in higher the audit efficiency, i.e., B0x,B0y {0, R+}, B0x  B0y, max
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟
𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅, 𝐵0𝑥 ) =
max
𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑟
𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅, 𝐵0𝑦) = max
𝑝1,𝑝2,0
𝑇𝑃𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝑅) 
Proof for Proposition 2: 
(2.1)  The nursing homes having intension to inflate make their decisions based on the expected payoffs 
of the following three cases: 
 0. Not Inflate.    0=0 
 1. Inflate 1 star.   1=A1 (1-p1-p1r) 
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 2. Inflate 2 stars.   2=A2 (1-p2-p2r)  
 In our problem, we have ∆𝐴1 ≤ ∆𝐴2 for all rating levels.   
Given r and p2, and set p1=0, Π2 = ∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟), denote the profit when p1=0 as Π10 = ∆𝐴1 
a) If 10 2, PCI0=p2.  When p1 increases, 1 decreases, thus 1 2 holds, and PCI=p2 
b) If 10> 2, PCI0=p1.  When p1 increases, 1 decreases.   
 The breakpoints is Π2 = 𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟) = ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟) = Π1, i.e.,  
𝑝1 ∗=
∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴2 + ∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)𝑝2
∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)
 
 When 𝑝1 > 𝑝1 ∗, we have 1< 2 , and PCI= p2.  In other words, 
 PCI= p1,   when 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝1 ∗ 
  p2, when 𝑝1 > 𝑝1 ∗ 
 Thus if 𝑝1 ∗< 𝑝2 holds, then PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p1  
𝑝1 ∗ −𝑝2 =
∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴2 + ∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)𝑝2
∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)
=
∆𝐴1 − ∆𝐴2
∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)
[1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝2] 
 Since
∆𝐴1−∆𝐴2
∆𝐴1(1+𝑟)
≤ 0, and 1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝2 > 0 when 2>0, thus  𝑝1 ∗ −𝑝2 ≤ 0, i.e., 𝑝1 ∗< 𝑝2 always 
holds when 2 >0.  In other words, PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p1.  
(2.2)  Given r and p1, and set p2=0, Π1 = ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟), Π20 = ∆𝐴2 > Π1, and PCI0=p2.  When p2 
increases, 2 decreases.   
 The breakpoints is Π2 = ∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟) = ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟) = Π1, i.e.,  
𝑝2 ∗=
∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1 + ∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)𝑝1
∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)
 
 When 𝑝2 > 𝑝2 ∗, we have 1> 2 , and PCI= p1.  In other words, 
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 PCI= p2,   when 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝2 ∗ 
  p1, when 𝑝2 > 𝑝2 ∗ 
 Thus if 𝑝2 ∗< 𝑝1, then PCI is monotonically non-decreasing in p2  
𝑝2 ∗ −𝑝1 =
∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1 + ∆𝐴1(1 + 𝑟)𝑝1 − ∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)𝑝1
∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)
=
∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2(1 + 𝑟)
[1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝1] 
 Since
∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2(1+𝑟)
≥ 0, and 1 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑝1 > 0 when 1>0, thus  𝑝2 ∗ −𝑝1 ≥ 0, i.e., 𝑝2 ∗> 𝑝1, as a 
result, when p2 increases,  PCI increases to p2*>p1 first, then drops back to p1 and stay at p1.  PCI is NOT 
monotonic in p2. 
(2.3)  Given p1 and p2, set r0=0, thus Π20 = ∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2), Π10 = ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1), 
 If Π20 > Π10, we have  
∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2) > ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1) 
∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1 > ∆𝐴2𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1𝑝1 
 Since ∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1 ≥ 0, if ∆𝐴2𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1𝑝1 < 0, then Π20 > Π10 holds.  
 When r increases, if Π2 > Π1 still holds, then PCI does not change.  In other words, 
∆𝐴2(1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑝2𝑟) > ∆𝐴1(1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝1𝑟) 
 Or  
∆𝐴2 − ∆𝐴1 > (∆𝐴2𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1𝑝1)(1 + 𝑟) 
Case 1: If ∆𝐴2𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1𝑝1 < 0, when r increases, the RHS decreases, thus the above equation always 
holds.  In this case, Π2 > Π1 holds when r increases.  PCI=p2, and will not change.  
Case 2: If ∆𝐴2𝑝2 − ∆𝐴1𝑝1 > 0, three subcases can be discussed. 
a:  If p1>p2, then Π20 > Π10 , the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1 (a).   
In this case 2>1 holds for >0, thus PCI=p2, and will not change. 
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b: If p1<p2, then if  Π20 > Π10, PCI=p2, the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1 (b).  
 In this case, when 𝑟 <
∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2𝑝2−∆𝐴1𝑝1
− 1, then  1< 2, and PCI = p2.    
 When 𝑟 >
∆𝐴2−∆𝐴1
∆𝐴2𝑝2−∆𝐴1𝑝1
− 1, then  1> 2, and PCI = p1.  
c: If p1<p2, then when Π20 < Π10, the payoff functions are shown in Figure 3-A.1(c).  
In this case, 1> 2  always holds , and PCI = p1, and will not change. 
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Figure 3-A.1. Three Cases of the Profit Function 
 
 
(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
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Table 3-A.1. Nursing Home (NH) Population Partition 
 
 
True Service Quality 
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I 
HI: NHs improve star rating legitimate ly, 
including HI1 and HI2 
HI2 – Honest NHs reporting 2-star improvement 
HI1 – Honest NHs reporting 1-star improvement 
LI: Inflators, including LI1 and LI2 
LI2 – Inflators inflating 1 star 
a 
LI1 – Inflators inflating 2 stars 
b 
NI HNI: Established NHs 
(LI0): Potential inflators who choose not 
to inflate c 
LNI: “Abandoned” NHs 
 
a. Nursing homes choosing to inflate 2 stars, if any, are confounded with the population HI2 
b. Nursing homes choosing to inflate 1 star, if any, are confounded with the population HI1 
c. Nursing homes with the intention to inflate but decide not to inflate due to unfavorable expected payoff.  
They are confounded with other honest nursing homes, and are also not the focus of audit.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
Chapter 4. Once for Ado: The Impact of Internet of Things Adoption and 
Subsidization 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Nursing homes are an important piece in the U.S. healthcare system.  Today there are over 16000 nursing 
home facilities in the U.S., providing care to 1.5 million residents.  They account for 6 percent of the 
Medicare population but 17 percent of total Medicare spending.  The service quality of nursing homes, 
however, varies significantly.  In 2007, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) designed 
and implemented its 5-star nursing home rating system.  Since its inception, the CMS rating has become 
the gold standard in the industry, and has been widely popular among patients, physicians and payers 
(Thomas, 2014).  The CMS 5-star rating system rates nursing homes based on three measures: on-site 
Inspection, Staffing and Quality Measures.  The on-site inspections are conducted by CMS-certified 
inspectors, while the other two domains are self-reported by nursing homes.  The overall star ratings is 
calculated by using the inspection star rating as a baseline, adding 1 star if any self-reported domain is 5 
stars and subtracting 1 star if any self-reported domain is 1 star (CMS, 2015).  Obviously, the two self-
reported domains can change a nursing home’s rating fundamentally.  An average nursing home which 
receives 3 stars in CMS inspection can have an excellent 5-star overall rating, if its two self-reported 
measures are 5 stars.  Cases have been reported in which patients’ experiences differ significantly from 
the CMS star ratings.  Some highly-rated nursing homes are sued for substandard care, even causing death 
of patient due to improper medical treatments.  Our previous research has found a significant positive 
association between nursing homes’ star rating change and their financial incentives to achieve high 
rating (Han 2015), and this association cannot be simply explained by nursing homes’ legitimate efforts.  
In other words, rating inflation does exist in the current system.   
 In recent years, the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) concept has gradually drawn the 
public attention, and presents new opportunities for research.  Internet of Things (IoT) typically refer to a 
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system of interrelated sensors, objects, mobile devices, mechanical and digital machines that are  provided 
with unique identifiers and are able to transfer data over a network without requiring human-to-human or 
human-to-computer interaction. Technologies based on IoT concepts have been successfully developed in 
the healthcare field, especially in the senior community and nursing homes.  For example, tracking 
devices with IoT technologies have been introduced to track the movement of senior patients and detect 
sudden falls.  Although these IoT applications in nursing homes are still relatively new and non-
systematical, the idea of applying IoT and related technologies is getting more and more popular, and can 
be a promising way to improve nursing homes’ service quality.   
The adoption of IoT technologies in nursing homes could significantly change the way nursing 
homes self-reports on both domains.  Starting July 2016, CMS’s requires all nursing homes to report 
Payroll- based journal (PBJ), and will relate these results with the self-reported staffing level (CMS, 
2016a).  Meanwhile, in the QM domain, CMS is going to add 5 additional measures (out of the 6 newly 
posted measures) to the current 9 measures (out of 18 measures) when giving the QM rating (CMS, 
2016b).  These requirements impose huge burdens on nursing homes’ daily operations, leading to 
additional operational costs.  The above staffing and quality measure data, however, can be collected 
automatically by using devices based on IoT technologies (Stenner 2011, Krawiec 2015).  As a result, IoT 
adoption could possibly release nursing homes from the burdens of self-reporting.   
Another potential use of IoT devices is to control self-reporting inflation.  When IoT devices are 
used, the data about the corresponding field which is previously self-reported is now automatically 
collected by these devices.  As a result, these potential inflators will have less room to inflate during self-
reporting, leading to more robust data collection.   
From CMS’s perspective, IoT adoption is not only a promising way to improve nursing homes’ 
service quality, but also serves an alternative way to control rating inflation comparing with the traditional 
audit method.  However, IoT techniques can be costly, which can be a major barrier for IoT adoption.  On 
the other hand, auditing an honest nursing home not only imposes huge burden to the nursing home, but 
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also wasted limited financial budget and human resources.  The fact triggers the interesting question that 
whether CMS can allocate certain amount of audit budget to subsidize nursing homes for IoT adoption.  
The subsidization gives nursing homes incentives to adopt IoT techniques, and reduces the ability that 
potential inflators can inflate, thus IoT subsidization can be a win-win situation for both nursing homes 
and CMS. 
 In this chapter, we systematically investigate the impact of IoT adoption on both the CMS rating 
system and on nursing homes’ decisions.  The chapter proceeds as follows:  In Section 4.2, we analyze 
the optimal staffing and IoT adoption level decisions for both honest nursing homes and inflators.  The 
results indicate that inflators are more reluctant to adopt IoT than the honest ones, since IoT adoption 
limits the ability of inflating.  We also find diversified staffing level reaction to IoT adoption for nursing 
homes with different service qualities.  We then analyze how the optimal IoT adoption level can be 
affected by CMS’s auditing and subsidization.  In Section 4.3, we analyze the problem from CMS’s 
perspective, and obtain insights for CMS on allocating budget between auditing and subsidization.  The 
chapter is concluded in Section 4.4.     
4.2 Nursing Homes’ Problem Formulation 
In this section, we first derive the framework for nursing homes’ profit maximization problem.  The 
general problem formulation for a nursing home’s problem is presented.  We then analyze honest nursing 
homes and inflators separately, and derive optimal IoT adoption and staffing decisions for both types. 
4.2.1 General Formulation 
We first build a general analytical model for nursing homes’ profit maximization problem 3.  A list of 
symbols used in this formulation can be found in Table 4-1.  As discussed in the literature, the staff-to-
                                                 
3 Though not all  the nursing homes are for-profit nursing homes, for-profit nursing homes are the majority.  
According to CMS data, at least 60% of nursing homes are for -profit nursing homes.  The remaining nursing homes 
are non-profit nursing homes or government owned nursing homes, which also pursue surplus income as the for-
profit ones, but they distribute the surplus income as dividends rather than profits.  In this research, we do not 
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patient ratio has been proved to be a major factor affecting the service quality of a nursing home (Lu 2015, 
Konetzaka 2008).  In our model, we use s to denote the staff-to-patient ratio4, i.e., the per patient staffing 
level.  Depending on the type of the nursing home, we assume s(0, 𝑠̅), where 𝑠̅ is the maximum staffing 
level nursing homes can have.  Besides staffing coverage, IoT adoption level is another key factor 
affecting the service quality of nursing homes.  In our model, we use k  to denote the IoT adoption rate, 
k[0, 1], i.e., a nursing home can choose not to use any IoT technology, choose to fully rely on IoT 
devices to collect data and do self-reporting, or choose to adopt IoT technologies at any level k  in order to 
maximize its profit.  The two decisions, staffing level and IoT adoption level, may also affect each other.  
The service quality of a nursing home is then denoted as 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑘).   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
differentiate the difference between for-profit nursing homes and non-profit or government owned nursing homes, 
and assume all  nursing homes maximize its profits as its goal.   
4 To keep the formulation consistent, we use the per patient staffing level, profit/revenue as the calculating unit 
throughout this dissertation. 
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Table 4-1 Symbols in the Problem Formulation 
R  Nursing home’s revenue 
Cs  Staffing cost 
Ck  IoT adoption cost 
Uk  IoT subsidization 
A  Highest revenue a nursing home with staffing level s and IoT level k can achieve 
  Nursing home revenue vertical position factor (different for each nursing home) 
s  Nursing home’s staffing level 
k    Nursing home’s IoT adoption level 
r  Punishment rate 
p   Audit probability 
u  Subsidization rate 
w  Staffing wage 
v  IoT unit adoption cost 
A  Maximum inflation gain 
CAud  Unit audit cost 
 N  Total Population 
NII  Inflator population 
NHI/NHN Population of honest NHs whose rating increase/do not increase 
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Besides service quality, nursing homes’ vertical position in its competing market can also affect 
its revenue function.  The vertical position of a nursing home can be viewed as the reputation of a nursing 
home, which is closely related to its CMS star rating.  It has been shown in Han et al (2015) that highly 
rated nursing homes have significantly higher revenues than their poorly rated counterparts.  In our 
formulation, we use  to denote a nursing home’s vertical position in the market,  > 0.  For each nursing 
home,  is different.  We use A to denote the highest revenue a nursing home can achieve.  A nursing 
home’s revenue R can then be expressed as a function of its service quality Q and its vertical position  as 
R(Q, ).  Since Q is a function of s and k , we can equivalently express the revenue as R(s, k , ), a 
function of staffing level s, IoT adoption level k , and vertical position .  Since  is exogenous, we 
simplify the notation and use R(s, k) to denote the revenue function of a nursing home.  In our model, we 
require R to be increasing in s and k, i.e.,     
𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘 + ∆𝑘) > 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘),        (4.1)   
𝑅(𝑠 + ∆𝑠, 𝑘) > 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘).          (4.2) 
Further, we require R to be capped by the most profitable type of patients, i.e., R is concave in 
both k and s, i.e.,  
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑘2
< 0, and 
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑠2
< 0, and  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑠
= 0, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑘
= 0. The assumption is based on the 
fact that no matter how high a nursing home’s staffing level is, or how advanced a nursing home’s IoT 
adoption level is, the revenue cannot go to infinity.  There is always a margin patient whose net utility of 
going to the nursing home is 0, i.e., it is indifferent for the patient to go to the nursing home or not.       
The operational costs of nursing homes are divided into two parts.  The cost associated with 
staffing level is denoted as Cs, which meaning refers to wages paid to nurses and administration staff.  In 
our model, re require Cs to be increasing and convex in s, i.e., 
𝜕𝐶𝑠
𝜕𝑠
> 0,  
𝜕2𝐶𝑠
𝜕 𝑠2
> 0.  Another part of cost is 
associated with IoT adoption, and is denoted as Ck.  This part mainly includes the maintenance of IoT 
devices.  Similar to Cs, in our model, we require Ck to be increasing and convex in k. 
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 In this research, we propose CMS to consider subsidizing nursing homes who adopt IoT 
technologies.  We use function Uk of k  to denote the amount CMS sets to subsidize IoT adoption.  Similar 
to the cost functions Cs and Ck, we require Uk to be also increasing and convex in k , i.e., 
𝜕𝑈𝑘
𝜕𝑘
> 0,  
𝜕2𝑈𝑘
𝜕𝑘2
≥
0. 
A nursing home maximizes its profit by optimizing its staffing level s and IoT adoption k.   A 
general form of a nursing home’s profit function is then given in equation (4.3). 
 𝜋 = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘,        (4.3) 
where Cs is the staffing cost, Ck is the IoT adoption cost, and Uk is the IoT adoption subsidization which is 
associated with the IoT adoption level.  If a nursing home does not adopt IoT technologies in its operation, 
then k = 0, and the nursing home has complete freedom on self-reporting decisions, though they can be 
audited after self-reporting.  In this case, the nursing home incurs zero cost on IoT technologies, and do 
not receive any subsidization for CMS, i.e., Ck = 0, and Uk = 0.  If a nursing home fully adopt IoT 
technologies, and completely rely on IoT technologies to collecting data for the self-reporting measures, 
then k=1.  In this case, the nursing home’s IoT cost Ck reaches the maximum, but the subsidization Uk 
also reaches the maximum.   
 It is ideally to obtain close form solutions on nursing homes’ optimal decision.  In the following 
analysis, we assume the following function forms for revenue function R, staffing cost Cs, IoT adoption 
cost Ck, and subsidization function Uk.  Our functions are in line with the existing literature on nursing 
homes’ staffing problems (Lu et al., 2015). 
 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘,         (4.4) 
 𝐶𝑠 = 𝑤𝑠,          (4.5) 
 𝐶𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘,          (4.6) 
 𝑈𝑘 = 𝑢𝑘          (4.7) 
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in which A denotes the maximum revenue a nursing home can achieve for its rating level, and 𝛼 is the 
revenue discount coefficient.  It can be easily verified that R(s, k) satisfies all the assumptions we made 
over revenue function, i.e., 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑠
> 0,  
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑘
> 0,  
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑄
> 0 , 
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑄
< 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑄→∞
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑄
= 0 .  Following most 
literature, we use a linear form of staffing cost function, which is also close to the reality.  We assume a 
linear form of the IoT cost function, in which Ck is proportional to the IoT adoption level k.  We also 
assume a linear form of the subsidization function 𝑈𝑘 , which is proportional to the nursing home’s IoT 
adoption level k .  In view that the QM domain consists of a bunch of detailed measures on each of the 
major aspects on patients’ daily life and can be itemized, the linear assumption on IoT cost function and 
subsidization function is also reasonable.    
In the following, we analyze nursing homes’ profits in extreme cases of s and k  combination.  If 
IoT adoption is k = 1, and s is big, i.e., the nursing home’s IoT technology level is advanced and staffing 
level is very high, then the revenue R approaches A, which is the maximum revenue the nursing home can 
achieve.  If s is very small (close to 0), i.e., the facility is understaffed, then the revenue R approaches A-
 𝛼, the lower limit of revenue.  The case of k  = 0 can be analyzed similarly, and it represents the case that 
the IoT technology level in the nursing home is very low.    
  The general form of a nursing home’s profit maximization problem can then be written as 
  max
𝑠,𝑘
𝜋 = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘 = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒
−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘..   (4.8) 
 Since honest nursing homes and inflators have different objectives when adopting IoT, we discuss 
these two types of nursing homes separately in the following.    
4.2.2 Nursing Homes’ Optimal Decisions  
Honest Nursing Homes: Honest nursing homes looking for service improvement may embrace IoT since 
these devices and techniques can improve the quality of care they can provide.  For an honest nursing 
home, its profit maximization problem can be written as   
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max 𝜋𝐻 = 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑘) − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑈𝑘 = 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒
−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘.   (4.9) 
 By taking partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to the decision variables s and k , 
we can solve equation (4.9), and obtain the following result.  
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑘
= 𝑠𝛼2𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑣 + 𝑢 = 0         (4.10) 
𝑘 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢
           (4.11) 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑠
= 𝑘𝛼2𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤 = 0         (4.12) 
𝑠 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑘
𝑙𝑛
𝑘𝛼2
𝑤
           (4.13) 
Inflating Nursing Homes: For inflators, they can also enjoy the benefits that IoT can bring to honest 
nursing homes, but they have additional concerns, since IoT adoption will squeeze the room that they can 
misreport, and make their inflation more difficult.  As a result, the inflating nursing homes have to take 
different audit policies into consideration, and may have different attitude to IoT adoption comparing with 
their honest counterparts.   
 Though CMS currently does not have an audit in place, it has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapter that audit is necessary in order to control inflation.  In this chapter, we keep the audit design 
consistent with our previous work.  In the audit, we assume CMS pre-announces its audit policy, with a 
proportion p and punishment rate r.  If nursing homes report increased star rating in self-reporting, they 
will be randomly selected based on the announced proportion p.  If an inflator is selected for audit, it will 
be caught.  Its illegitimate profit gain will be confiscated, and a fine will be issued against it, which is  
calculated based on the punishment rate r.  The inflators will then calculate their expected payoffs based 
on the policy announced and decide whether to inflate or not.  Define the maximum profit gain through 
inflation to be ∆𝐴.  In our model, ∆𝐴  is achieved only when the inflator does not adopt any IoT 
technology, i.e., k = 0.  According to our assumption, when a nursing home fully adopt IoT technologies, 
the nursing homes’ data collection will completely depend on IoT devices, and there will be no room for 
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the nursing home to inflate, i.e., ∆𝐴 = 0, when k = 1.  We thus use a linear function to denote a inflating 
nursing home’s illegitimate maximum revenue A’. 
𝐴′ = 𝐴 + (1 − 𝑘)∆𝐴          (4.14) 
Apparently, A’>A and the illegitimate profit takes values in [0, ∆𝐴]. 
An important question to ask is that under what condition will the inflators choose to inflate.  To 
provide answer to this question, we compare the expected revenue of an inflator when it is inflating, and 
the revenue of the same nursing home when it chooses to stay honest, as shown in equation (4.15).  An 
inflator will inflate only when the expected revenue of inflating is higher than that of being honest. 
𝑝[𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑟∆𝐴(1 − 𝑘)] + +(1 − 𝑝)(𝐴 + ∆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘) > 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘, (4.15) 
 Solving equation (4.15), we can obtain the inflating condition: 
1-p-pr>0, or           (4.16) 
𝑝 <
1
1+𝑟
.          (4.17) 
In other words, the inflators make inflation decisions according to the announced audit policy (p,r) 
only.  If p and r satisfy the condition listed in (4.17), the expected revenue of inflating will exceed the 
revenue of being honest, and inflator will choose to inflate5.  The IoT adoption can reduce the extent to 
which the inflator can inflate, but cannot change the inflators’ decisions.  In order to avoid trivial cases 
that all nursing homes are deterred from inflating, our model, we assume that inflating condition (4.17) is 
always satisfied, i.e., there are always inflators in the system, and they will always choose to inflate.  The 
population of the inflators is assumed to be constant. 
For inflators, its profit maximization can be expressed as: 
                                                 
5 Different from the settings in chapter 3, we use a simplified model in this research in which we do not consider 
the possibility that some inflating nursing homes may only inflate 1 star, though inflating 2 stars is possible.  Such 
case exists in reality due to the fact that the probability to be audited when inflating 2 stars can be set higher than 
that of inflating 1 star.  There can be other legal costs, which deter nursing homes from inflating to the maximum 
level though possible.  However, in our model, we do not capture these aspects, and assume that the punishment 
to inflators are purely financial.   
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max 𝜋𝐼 = 𝑝[𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒
−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑟∆𝐴(1 − 𝑘)]  
+(1 − 𝑝)(𝐴 + ∆𝐴(1 − 𝑘) − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘) − 𝑤𝑠 − 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘     (4.18) 
The optimal staffing level and IoT adoption level of an inflator can thus be calculated. 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑘∗
= −∆𝐴(1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) + 𝛼2𝑒−𝑘𝑠𝑠 + 𝑢 − 𝑣 = 0      (4.19) 
𝑘 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟)
         (4.20) 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑠∗
= 𝑘𝛼2𝑒−𝛼𝑠𝑘 − 𝑤 = 0          (4.21) 
𝑠 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑘
𝑙𝑛
𝑘𝛼2
𝑤
          (4.22)  
Summarizing the results for honest nursing homes and inflators, we have Proposition 1 as stated 
below: 
Proposition 1: NH’s optimal IoT and staffing decisions 
a) For both honest and inflating nursing homes, its optimal staffing level is  𝑠 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑘
𝑙𝑛
𝑘𝛼2
𝑤
 .   
b) The optimal IoT adoption level for an honest nursing home is 𝑘 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢
 .  The optimal IoT 
adoption level for an inflator is 𝑘 ∗=
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟)
 <
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢
, if inflation condition is satisfied, 
i.e., 1-p-pr>0.   
c) The optimal IoT adoption level k* and staffing level s* are increasing in .  
Proposition 1 indicates that when a nursing home inflates its self-reporting to gain more profits, 
its optimal IoT adoption level is less than the IoT level should it be honest.  The result is reasonable, since 
IoT limits a nursing home’ inflating ability.  It is also noted that in this model, we require uv, so that the 
natural log function is defined.  In other word, the subsidization makes IoT adoption less costly to nursing 
homes, but nursing homes are not awarded more money then what they spent for adopting IoT.  It is also 
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observed that the optimal IoT adoption level k* and optimal staffing level s* are increasing in .  
According to our assumption, the service quality also increases in , so is the revenue.   
4.2.3 Nursing Homes’ Staffing Level Reaction to IoT Adoption   
In the previous section, we analyzed nursing homes’ optimal staffing level and IoT adoption level 
decisions.  The two decisions, however, are not exogenous, and may affect each other.  Empirical 
evidence has been reported in Zhang et al. (2016) and Lu et al. (2015) that the adoption of technologies 
has different impacts on staffing levels.  In this section, we analyze how nursing homes’ optimal staffing 
level will change with respect to changes in IoT adoption levels for honest nursing homes and inflators, 
and obtain insights on the relationship between optimal staffing level and optimal IoT adoption level. 
According to equation (4.13) and (4.22), for both honest nursing homes and inflators, we have 
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑘
=
1
𝛼𝑘2
(1 − 𝑙𝑛
𝛼2𝑘
𝑤
)>0,         (4.23) 
then we have 
𝛼 < √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
.           (4.24) 
In other words, an increase in nursing home’s IoT adoption level will lead to an increase in 
staffing levels for nursing homes if 𝛼 < √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
, and will lead to a decrease in staffing levels for nursing 
homes if 𝛼 > √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
.  The threshold is  𝛼 = √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
.  
Proposition 2: The impact of IoT adoption on nursing homes’ staffing decision. 
For nursing homes satisfying 𝛼 < √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
, IoT adoption will increase its optimal staffing level.  For 
nursing homes satisfying 𝛼 > √
𝑤𝑒
𝑘
, IoT adoption will decrease its optimal staffing level.  The conditions 
hold for both honest nursing homes and inflators. 
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Since the optimal revenue at optimal staffing level 
1
𝛼𝑘
𝑙𝑛
𝑘𝛼2
𝑤
 is 𝑅 ∗= 𝐴 − 𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝑠∗𝑘 = 𝐴 −
𝑤
𝛼𝑘
.  We 
have 
𝜕𝑅∗
𝜕𝛼
=
𝑤
𝑘𝛼2
> 0.  As discussed in the model introduction part, 𝛼 can be viewed as a vertical position 
indicator for nursing homes in its competing market, i.e., for highly rated nursing homes with big  𝛼, their 
revenue R is higher.   
Proposition 2 thus indicate that for highly ranked nursing homes, increasing IoT will lead to a 
decreased staffing level s, while for poorly rated nursing homes, increasing IoT will lead to an increased 
staffing level s.  This conclusion is in line with the ones found in Lu et al. (2015).    
 The different reaction of staffing level to IoT adoption can be interpreted in the following way.  
IoT adoption improves the efficiency for the staff, thus the marginal quality from more staff increases, 
which brings in more staff.  This complementary effect of IoT adoption on staffing level.  On the other 
hand, since we have R concave in k and 
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑘2
< 0, if service quality is high enough, the increased revenue 
resulted from additional IoT usage will eventually be overwhelmed by the increasing staff wage, leading 
to a reduced staffing level when IoT level increases.  This is the substitution effect of IoT adoption on 
staffing level.  The two effects dominate each other on nursing homes with different vertical positions in 
competing markets, leading to a diversified staffing decision on IoT adoption.  As a result, adopting IoT 
may or may not bring additional profits to the nursing homes, depending on the adoption cost and other 
factors.   
4.2.4 Controlling IoT by Auditing and Subsidization 
Introducing IoT to nursing homes can not only increase service quality, but is also an alternative way for 
CMS to control inflation in self-reporting other than using traditional audit method.  However, due to 
investment cost and unforeseen changes in staffing and operations, nursing homes may not have 
incentives to adopt IoT, and subsidization may be needed in order to align nursing homes’ incentives for 
IoT adoption.   
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In this section, we derive conditions to obtain insights on how CMS can control IoT adoption by 
auditing and subsidization, and in turn control inflation.  We calculate the partial derivat ive of the optimal 
IoT adoption level of honest nursing homes and inflators with respect to the CMS’s audit parameter p6 
and subsidization parameter u. 
For honest nursing homes, k ∗=
1
αs
ln
sα2
v−u
, thus 
  
∂k∗
∂u
=
1
αs(v−u)
> 0          (4.25) 
since v-u>0, and  
∂k∗
∂p
= 0.          (4.26) 
For inflators,  k ∗=
1
αs
ln
sα2
v−u+∆A(1−p−pr)
, thus 
∂k∗
∂u
=
1
αs(v−u+∆A(1−p−pr))
 >0         (4.27)  
and  
∂k∗
∂p
=
∆A(1+r)
αs(v−u+∆A(1−p−pr))
> 0,         (4.28) 
since v-u>0, and 1-p-pr>0. 
Proposition 3. CMS’s control of IoT adoption by adjusting u and p 
a) CMS can affect honest nursing homes’ optimal IoT adoption level by subsidization.  The 
optimal IoT level is monotonically increasing in u, with gradient  
1
𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢)
.  CMS cannot affect honest 
nursing homes’ IoT adoption by adjusting audit probability p.   
                                                 
6 According to the inflating condition, the relationship between p and r determines the audit policy.  In practice, 
adjusting audit probability p is usually easier than adjusting punishment ra te r.  Similar case can be found in tax 
fraud detection, in which IRS has adjusted auditing probability several times over the years, but the punishment 
rate is relatively stable.  As a result, we consider audit probability p as a decision variable that CMS can adjust 
accordingly, but assume r is preannounced and do not change. 
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b) CMS can affect inflators’ optimal IoT adoption level by both subsidization and audit.  The 
optimal IoT level is monotonically increasing in both u and p.  The gradients are  
1
𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟))
 and 
∆𝐴(1+𝑟)
𝛼𝑠(𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟))
, respectively.   
c) For IoT adoption, honest nursing homes are more sensitive to subsidization than inflators.  
According to Proposition 3, the rate for controlling inflators’ IoT adoption level by adjusting p is 
∆A(1 + r) times as much as controlling IoT adoption by u.  In practice, if ∆A is big, i.e., the maximum 
profit gain from inflation is big, then controlling IoT adoption by p is more effective.  If ∆A is very small, 
and ∆A(1 + r) < 1, then controlling IoT adoption by subsidization is more effective. 
The results also indicate that inflators are less sensitive to subsidization than their honest 
counterparts.  The difference is big when the term ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓(1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) is significantly larger than 0.  If 
∆𝐴 is very small, or if 𝑝 ≈
1
1+𝑟
, such that 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟 is close to 0, then difference is not significant. 
4.3. Allocating Resources between Auditing and Subsidization 
In this section, we analyze the problem from CMS’s point of view, and summarize insights on allocating 
limited budget between auditing and subsidization. 
Suppose there are totally N nursing homes.  The population of honest nursing homes and inflators 
are denoted as NH and NI, respectively.  The population of honest nursing homes whose rating increased 
after self-reporting and inflators is denoted as NHI.  The population of inflators (whose ratings also 
increase after self-reporting) is denoted as NII.  The population of honest nursing home whose ratings do 
not increase after self-reporting is denoted as NHN.  We assume that the inflate condition is satisfied, i.e., 
p <
1
1+r
, thus all inflators will inflate to the maximum amount they can, i.e., except for the measures self-
reported by the IoT technologies they adopt, they will inflate all other measures.  Thus we have NII=NI, 
and NIN=0, i.e., there is no inflator who is deterred by the audit policy and decides to stay honest.  
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Suppose xi is a binary variable which denotes the audit status of the ith nursing home, xi=1, if the nursing 
home is audited, and xi=0, if the nursing home is not audited. 
4.3.1 The Damage of An Inflator 
The damage of an inflator is normalized to 1, and is defined as di=(1-ki)(1-xi).  If an inflator is audited, 
and xi=1, then di=0, and the inflator makes no damage to the rating system.  If an inflator is not audited, 
and accept IoT technologies to level ki, ki[0, 1], then the damage to the system is 1-ki.  It can be seen 
that if the inflator’s IoT adoption rate ki is high, i.e., close to 1, then even it is not audited, its damage to 
the system is still very small, or close to 0.  On the other hand, if an inflator’s IoT adoption level is low, 
i.e., close to 0, then if it is not audited, it will make a severe damage to the system, i.e., close to 1.   
4.3.2 Two-level Structure 
The problem has a 2-level structure, with CMS minimizing inflator damage to the system by determining 
audit probability p and subsidization amount Sub at the higher level, and nursing homes, both honest ones 
and inflators, maximining profits by selecting optimal IoT adoption level k and staffing level s at the 
lower level, as shown in Figure 4-1.  Note that the optimal staffing level or each nursing home is not 
directly related to the CMS’s problem, but the IoT adoption level ki for each nursing home i directly 
affect CMS’s subsidization budget.   
The CMS’s problem is to minimize the damage of all inflators to the system, which can be 
written as follows. 
min
p,u
∑ (1 − k i )(1 − xi )
NII
i=1          (4.29) 
s.t.   ∑ k i u
N
i=1 + (NII + NHI)pCAud ≤ B0 + NIIpr∆A       (4.30) 
∑ xi
NII
i=1 = pNII           (4.31)  
and the KKT conditions (4.20) describing optimal ki for NII inflators, and the KKT conditions (4.11) for 
NH honest nursing homes.   
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Figure 4-1 A 2-level Problem Structure 
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4.3.3 Decomposition and Individual Subproblem 
To analyze the CMS’s overall problem directly is very complicated.  Notice that CMS’s objective is to 
minimize the damage of the inflators within the budget.  If an inflating nursing home is audited and 
caught, its damage to the system reduces to 0.  If an inflating nursing home is not audited, its damage to 
the system is 1-k, and IoT adoption level k is the only factor restricting its damage.  In other words, CMS 
wants to limit the damage of the inflators who are not audited to a low level by subsidizing IoT. 
For each inflator, it has a probability p to be audited, and probability 1-p to be not audited.  The 
expected damage can then be calculated as 
E[di ] = p ∗ 0 + (1 − p)(1 − k i),        (4.32) 
where ki is its optimal IoT adoption level which is determined in the nursing home’s profit maximization 
problem.  The CMS’s problem can then be decomposed and written as to minimize the expected damage 
for each inflator by selecting the right audit policy (p, r), and subsidization amount u.  The individual 
subproblem can be written as 
min
p,u
E[di] = p ∗ 0 + (1 − p)(1 − k i) = (1 − p)(1 − k i)     (4.33) 
s.t.  ∑ k i u
N
i=1 + (NII + NHI)pCAud ≤ B0 + ∑ ∆A (1 − k i)r
pNII
i=1 ,     (4.34) 
and KKT condition (4.20). 
The budget constraint (4.34) can be written as 
𝐻𝑢 + 𝐽𝑝 ≤ B0,           (4.35) 
where H and J are functions of k.    
𝐻 = ∑ k i
N
i=1 = 𝑁𝑘, and         (4.36) 
𝐽 = (𝑁𝐼𝐼 + 𝑁𝐻𝐼)𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑 − 𝑟∆A(1 − 𝑘
?̅?)𝑁𝐼𝐼        (4.37) 
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The problem is highly nonlinear and very difficult to be analyzed quantitatively.  We instead 
summarize qualitative insights which can help CMS allocate its budget.  To analyze the problem, we plot 
it in the plane spanned by u and p, as shown in Figure 4-2.   
We are interested in the square area where p[0,1], and u[0,v].  According to Proposition 3, k 
increases in u monotonically, thus 1-k decreases in u monotonically.  Similarly, we can also know that 1-
k decreases in p monotonically, and (1-p)(1-k) decreases in p faster.  For a given damage level d, the level 
curve function can be calculated as 
𝑑 = (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑘) = (1 − 𝑝)(1 −
1
𝛼𝑠
𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝛼2
𝑣−𝑢+∆𝐴(1−𝑝−𝑝𝑟)
),    (4.38) 
or equivalently,  
𝑢 = 𝑣 + ∆𝐴(1 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟) − 𝑠𝛼2𝑒
(
𝑑
1−𝑝
−1)𝛼𝑠
.      (4.39)  
Thus we have  
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑝
= −∆𝐴 − ∆𝐴𝑟 + 𝑠2𝛼3𝑑
1
(1−𝑝)2
𝑒
(
𝑑
1−𝑝
−1)𝛼𝑠
.           (4.40) 
It can be seen that when p increase, the third term increases, but the first two terms are negative 
and unchanged, thus the level curve is convex on the plane spanned by u and p, and can be plotted as 
shown in Figure 4-2.  The gradient is also plotted which is orthogonal to the level curve, as shown in 
Figure 4-2 as an arrow.  In this problem, the budget constraint is binding, and the optimal solution is 
achieved on the budget constraint, as shown in Figure 4-2 as a red dot.      
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Figure 4-2 The CMS’s Damage Minimization Problem (plotted on p and u) 
 
 
 
  
P 
Optimal 
Solution 
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When 𝐻 = 𝑁𝑘  is big, the optimal solution moves towards the intersection of the budget 
constraint and horizontal axis p, i.e., CMS should allocate more budget in audit rather than in 
subsidization.  The following cases are included in this scenario:  
Proposition 4.1. Cases that CMS should allocate more budget in audit than in subsidization. 
i) The total population N is big.   
ii) The average level of IoT adoption is already high (𝑘 is large).    
When 𝐽 = (𝑁𝐼𝐼 + 𝑁𝐻𝐼)𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑 − 𝑟∆A(1 − 𝑘 ?̅?)𝑁𝐼𝐼 is big, the optimal solution moves towards the intersection 
of the budget constraint and vertical axis u, i.e., CMS should allocate more budget in subsidization than in 
audit.  The following cases are included in this scenario: 
Proposition 4.2. Cases that CMS should allocate more budget in subsidization than in audit 
i) The population of confounding honest nursing homes is high (NHI is large) 
ii) Unit audit cost CAud is high 
iii) Punishment rate r is low 
iv) The additional profit ∆𝐴 that nursing homes can gain is small    
v) The average IoT adoption level 𝑘 ?̅? for inflators is small. (This may be difficult to be observed 
directly, but can be partially reflected in the overall average IoT adoption level 𝑘) 
4.3.4 Under What Condition Shall CMS Subsidize 
It is important to analyze the conditions under which CMS shall consider using subsidization.  
From Figure 4-2, we can easily find that when the optimal solution is not the corner point P, CMS should 
consider subsidization.  Since we have shown the convexity of the level curves, the condition can be 
restated as follows: When the slope of the level curve at point P is higher (slope is negative) than the 
slope of the budget constraint, there will be a tangent point in the first quadrant, which is the optimal 
solution to the problem. 
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Proposition 5.  Conditions Under Which Subsidization is Necessary 
 CMS should consider subsidizing IoT when inequality 
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑝
|
𝑢=0
> −
𝐽
𝐻
 is satisfied.   
 Solving the inequality directly, however, is complicated, but we can obtain insights by analyzing 
some extreme cases.  Consider the case in which the optimal IoT adoption level for all inflators is k  =0.  
This can happen when r is small, i.e., when nursing homes won’t be punished a lot for inflating.  In this 
case, d = 1-p, and the inequality (4.41) reduces to  
−∆𝐴 − ∆𝐴𝑟 +
𝑠2 𝛼3
1−𝑝
> −
(𝑁𝐼𝐼 +𝑁𝐻𝐼)𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑−𝑟∆𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐼
𝑁?̅?
        (4.41) 
∆𝐴 <
𝑠2𝛼3𝑁?̅?+(𝑁𝐼𝐼+𝑁𝐻𝐼)(1−𝑝)𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑑
((1+𝑟)𝑁?̅?−𝑟𝑁𝐼𝐼)(1−𝑝)
        (4.42) 
Equation (4.42) can be interpreted as follows: If the gains from inflation is large, the inflators will 
choose to inflate and refuse to adopt IoT.  In this case, CMS should not consider subsidization, and the 
optimal solution is the corner point P, i.e., to allocate all the budget on auditing.  CMS should only 
consider subsidization when the inflating gain ∆𝐴 is under certain threshold. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we create an analytical model to systematically investigate the impact of IoT adoption on 
the nursing home rating system and their operations decisions.  We derive conditions for inflating and 
honest nursing homes to show their optimal staffing level decisions and IoT adoption level decisions.  We 
find that highly rated nursing homes will have a decreased staffing level when IoT is adopted, but poorly 
rated nursing homes will have their staffing level increased after IoT adoption.  Since IoT devices can 
automatically collect data which is originally self-reported by nursing homes, IoT adoption reduces the 
possibility of misreporting.  However, IoT technologies can be costly and CMS may consider subsidizing 
IoT adoption and push it through, and use it as an alternative way to control rating inflation other than the 
traditional audit method.  We derive close conditions to show how CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT 
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adoption by auditing and subsidization, respectively.  We also obtain insights on how CMS should 
allocate limited resources between auditing and subsidization.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays which addresses a series of issues in CMS’s 5-star 
Nursing Home Compare system.  In the first essay, we conducted an empirical study to demonstrate the 
existence of rating inflation.  We find a significant association between the changes in a nursing home’s 
star rating and its profits, which points to a financial incentive for nursing homes to inflate the ratings.  By 
using the number of patients’ complaints as a proxy of the true service quality, we are able to demonstrate 
the existence of rating inflation.  A prediction model is then developed, which provides a quantitative 
evaluation on the system’s performance.  In the second essay, we look into methods to improve the rating 
system.  By using an innovative graph-based method, we are able to formulate the problem in a linear 
form, and solve it based on CMS data.  The results show that when minimizing the difficulty to catch 
inflators, the current inspection domain is the optimal choice, and an effective audit system is necessary.  
An audit system is then designed for CMS, and insights are obtained on setting optimal audit parameters.  
In the third essay, we analyze how technologies, particularly IoT, can affect the rating system and nursing 
homes’ operational decisions.  A game theoretical model is developed with CMS minimizing inflation 
damage at the higher level and nursing homes maximizing profits at the lower level.  We propose that IoT 
adoption subsidization can be an alternative method for CMS to control inflation, and we analyze how 
CMS can affect nursing homes’ IoT adoption level by auditing and subsidization.  We also obtain insights 
on CMS’s budget allocation between auditing and subsidization.  
The results in this dissertation pinpoint the key issues in CMS’s nursing home rating system, and 
provide a guideline for CMS’s rating system reform.  Some of the results can also be extended to other 
rating system sharing similar features.  For example, the physician rating system developed by CMS also 
uses a combination of inspection and self-reported measures to generate ratings, thus the inflation 
detection method we developed in chapter 2 can be applied to this system easily.   
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